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CASH SELLERS, SECURED FINANCERS
AND THE MEAT INDUSTRY:
AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES TWO AND NINE
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ZIPPORAH BATSHAW WISEMAN*
The American red meat eater has been one of the more publicized
victims of the economic problems of the 1970's. News stories focused on
the plight of the ultimate consumer of meat,' but rising meat prices and
tight money have claimed other victims too—the cattle rancher, 2 the cattle
feeder, the meat packer and the lending institutions which finance the op-
erations of the packers. From 1958 to 1975 one hundred and sixty-seven
meat packers failed, leaving livestock sellers with $43,028,703 in unpaid
bills. 3
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University; B.A., McGill University, 1950; L.L.B., Yale
University, 1954.
Colleagues, friends and family too numerous to mention helped with this article. Pro-
fessors Daniel Schaffer of Northeastern and Andrew L. Kaufman of Harvard were especially
generous with their time and made many valuable criticisms of earlier drafts. My thanks go
also to my students Sarah Dowling, Anne Goldstein and Paul Hempel for helping in the prep-
aration Of this article, Above all, I wish to express my gratitude to my colleague Professor
Judith Olans Brown without whom this article never would have been written.
1 Raskin, Outrage But Little Impact, N,Y. Times, April 8, 1973, § 4 (The Week in Re-
view), at 1, cot. 1; Charlton, How Was It Possible, id., col. 4.
2 "Cattle," in industry parlance, are any bovine animal including dairy cows, bulls, and
overage breeding animals as well as steers. "Livestock" are living animals raised for meat, in-
cluding hogs, lambs, sheep and cattle, but excluding poultry. "Meat," however, includes poul-
try as well as the meat from hogs, lambs, sheep and cattle. Interview with Clark Weaver, Vice
President and General Counsel, Monfort Packing, Colorado (December 3, 1976) (notes on file
with the author) [hereinafter cited as Weaver).
3 The yearly breakdown of these losses, according to the Packers and Stockyards Ad-
ministration, are as follows:
Year
No. of
Packers
Original Amount
Owed For
Livestock
Amount
Paid
Amount
Still
Owed
1958 7 $	 ,568,679 $	 95,726 $	 472,953
1959 10 1,370,328 158,266 1,212,062
1960 7 408,853 235,335 173,518
1961 7 494,032 173,637 320,395
1962 17 1,612,163 6,733 1,605,430
1963 6 826,423 90,000 736,423
1964 3 , 115,098 33,007 82,091
1965 13 1,992,351 73,000 1,919,351
1966 9 2,189,099 363,582 1,825,517
1967 9 1,997,748 18,907 1,978,841
1968 10 1,041,371 — 1,041,371
1969 12 870,064 5,300 864,764
1970 14 2,021,342 450,000 1,571,342
1971 12 1,666,505 525,594 1,141,111
1972 11 843,544 110,251 733,293
1973 8 704, 360 5,990 698,370
101
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The response to the economic distress of cattle sellers involved the
United States Congress,4 the President of the United States, 5 state legisla-
tures including the Texas Legislature, 8 and the many segments of the
American meat industry. Much of the energy of all of these institutions was
spent—or misspent—trying to understand the intricacies of the Uniform
Commercial Code as it affects the meat industry and to decide on a policy
level the best means for regulating the industry.
The economic situation within the meat industry also has produced
significant litigation between the creditors of bankrupt packers. This article
will discuss the litigation which arose from a dispute between cattle sellers
and a finance company both caught by the bankruptcy of Samuels & Co., a
Texas meat packer. On April 30, 1970, Samuels & Co., Inc., was adjudi-
cated bankrupt. One of Samuels & Co.'s creditors was its long time fi-
nancer, C.I.T. Corporation. At the time of the bankruptcy, Samuels & Co.
owed C.I.T. over 1.8 million dollars; Samuels also owed fifteen Texas cattle
sellers over 50 thousand dollars for delivered but unpaid for cattle. The
contest between these two creditors in this seemingly commonplace bank-
ruptcy' lasted from 1969 to 1976 8 and required the energy of six federal
1974 9 2,357,744 20,000 2,337,744
1975
(first 3 mos) 3 24,314,127 24,314,127
167 $45,393,831 $2,365,128 $43,028,703
S. REP. No, 932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE. CONG. & An. NEWS 3749,
3753.
By far the largest such bankruptcy was that of American Beef Packers, in 1975, which
left over twenty-million dollars in bad checks in the hands of producers and sellers of livestock
in thirteen states. Amendments to Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921: Hearings on H.R. 8410 and
Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Livestock and Grains of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1975) (statement of Sen. Henry Bel!mon, Okla.) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on H.R. 8410]; id. at 124 (letter of Jon Wefald, Minnesota Dept. of Agriculture); id at
72-73 (statement of B.H. Jones, Nat'l Livestock Ass'n).
'The House held three days of hearings on proposed bills to remedy the problem.
Hearings on H.R. 8410, supra note 3. The Senate also held three days of hearings on proposed
bills, Livestock Marketing: Hearings on S. 1532 and S. 2034 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural
Production, Marketing and Stabilization of Prices of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 15327, and Livestock Marketing:
Hearings on S. 1532 [Amend. 1060], Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Production, Marketing and
Stabilization of Prices of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060) 1.
The bill which was eventually adopted, H.R. 8410, was considered and passed in the
House on May 6, 1976, and considered and passed (as amended) in the Senate on June 17,
1976. 122 CONG. REC. 4004-4028, 9697 (1976). The conference report was agreed to by the
Senate on August 4, 1976, and by the House on August 30, 1976. 122 CONG. REC. 9224-28,
13,425-26 (1976).
5
 President's Message on the Packers and Stockyards Act. 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1334-35 (Sept. 13, 1976).
Payment for Livestock Purchased for Slaughter Act. TEX. REV. C1Y. STAT. ANN. art.
6910b (Vernon Supp. 19A 1976-77).
The Samuels bankruptcy left only $54,793 of unpaid bills for the purchase of
livestock. As noted earlier, see text at note 3 supra, livestock sellers' losses from meat packer
failures for the years 1958 to 1975 totaled $43 million. See note 3 supra for a table of these
losses.
8
 The matter first came before the federal courts when Samuels & Co. filed a plan of
arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act on May 23, 1969. The Supreme Court
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courts and twenty-five federal judges.
The six judicial opinions which emerged from this litigation reflect a
fascinating conflict in the application of the Uniform Commercial Code. Six
judges" were overly concerned with the particular equities of the industry
at the expense of coherent legal analysis; ten judges" read the Code so lit-
erally that they overlooked both the underlying policy of the Code and
economic constraints of the industry.
The broad goals of the drafters, proponents and supporters of the
Code, adopted in Texas in 1965, 12 were uniformity and flexibility." The
Code prescribes the procedures, defines the rights, and allocates the risks
of parties to various commercial transactions involving personal property.
This framework is intended to reflect the economic realities of commercial
practice." The final opinion in Samuels' followed the interpretation of Ar-
ticles 2 and 9 adopted by a majority of courts and was decided in favor of
the financer, C.I.T. Corporation. This interpretation did not lead to an
economically rational solution to the conflict between the unpaid cattle sell-
ers and the secured lender.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether a more creative,"
less literal, reading of the Code might have led the courts to integrate the
interpretation of technical statutory language, and the resolution of the
ambiguous relationship of Articles 2 and 9 of the Code with the economic
realities and resulting equities of the meat industry. The thesis of this arti-
cle is that this would have produced a better result than the actual outcome
for both the Uniform Commercial Code and the industry.
This article has four parts. Part I describes the meat industry—the
process by which cattle become food and the roles which individual and in-
stitutional actors play in this process. Part II is an overview of the statutory
provisions which the courts used in attempting to sort out the relationships
and interests of the actors who became parties to In re Samuels. Part Ill
examines the wisdom of the various judicial approaches to this problem in
the six Samuels opinions. The last section, Part IV, suggests a solution which
finally terminated the litigation by denying certiorari in a memorandum opinion reported on
October 4, 1976. Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
In re Samuels & Co„ Inc., No 13K 3-1314 (W.D. Tex., January 19, 1972) reed No. BK
3-1314 (N.D. Tex., November 24, 1972), rend per curiam sub nom., Samuels & Co., Inc. v.
Mahon, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974),
on remand, Samuels & Co., Inc. v. Mahon, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd en bane, 526 F.2d
1238 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
10
 Referee Elmore Whitehurst, Fifth Circuit Judges Robert A. Ainsworth, Joe McDonald
Ingraham, Griffin B. Bell, James P. Coleman and Walter Pettus Gewin.
11 District Court Judge Sarah Tilghman Hughes, Fifth Circuit Judges John C. Godbold,
John Minor Wisdom, Homer Thornberry, Irving L. Goldberg, David W. Dyer, Lewis R. Mor-
gan, Charles Clark, Paul H. Roney and Thomas G.'Gee.
12 TEX. Bus. & Cost CODE ANN. tit. 1 §§ 1-101 et seq. (Vernon 1967). Since there are no
substantive differences between the provisions of the U.C.C. dealt with in this article and the
Texas enactment thereof, the U.C,C. will be cited directly. The reader should note that the
Texas enactment has replaced hyphens with points and that with a few exceptions, it has
changed numerical sequences to letter sequences and letter sequences to numerical sequences
in denoting the subsections. Thus, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-802(1)(b) becomes Texas 1} 3.802(a)(2).
U.C.C. H 1-102(1) and (2), 1-102, Comment 1.
' 4 1d.
15 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
'° See, e.g., In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
103
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
would have been in harmony with applicable law without ignoring eco-
nomic reality.
I. THE MEAT INDUSTRY, THE MONEY MARKET AND THE SAMUELS
BANKRUPTCY
A. The Meat Industry
The process by which a newborn calf becomes hamburger on the
table is called the meat industry." This industry produces the single most
important source of protein in the American diet. It also accounts for ap-
proximately one-third of American farmers' total income." The value of
livestock merchandising transactions between 1971 and 1975 varied be-
tween 25.2 and 42.8 billion dollars." The dollar volume of commerce in
meat and livestock was about half that of automobile retail sales in the same
years, about equal to department store retail sales, and about one-tenth of
total retail sales. 2 °
How do cattle get from the farmer's barn to the consumer's table?
When a calf is ten to twelve months old, the farmer, known as a rancher,
sells the calf to a feeder or a feedlot. The feeder grows or buys feedcorn
and grain for the cattle, and pays the veterinarian's bills. When the cattle
are fattened and the market seems favorable the feeder sells the livestock
to a packer for slaughter. 2 '
After purchasing the livestock from the feeder, the packer slaughters
the cattle and prepares it for distribution to supermarket chains, "pur-
veyors" or wholesale dealers, restaurants, hotels and other institutions. 22 It
is from there that the meat reaches the consumer as roasts, steaks, ham-
burger and other prized adornments of the American table.
B. How the Meat Industry is Financed
Each stage of the meat industry requires financing. The rancher gen-
" Hearings on H.R. 8410, supra note 3, at 21 (statement of Curtis Jones); id. at 24
(statement of William H. Heubaum).
"Id. at 59 (statement of John M. Damgard, U.S., Department of Agriculture).
" Id. at 107 (statement of C.T. Sanders, Director, Livestock Laws Reform Commission).
2° These figures are taken from SANDERS, MEASURING LIVESTOCK COMMERCE 5 (1974)
and id. at 4-5 (1975).
21 Weaver, supra note 2.
Fifty years ago over 80% of all livestock was sold through large "terminal markets."
H.R. REP. No. 932, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3749, 3752. The feeders sold their livestock to these great markets, who, in turn, sold them to
the packers. By the mid-1950's the packers' buying pattern had changed from terminal mar-
kets to country auction markets, Hearings on H.R. 8410, supra note 3, at 97 (statement of R.E.
Cunningham), thereby eliminating the intermediary terminal market. Id. at 70 (statement of
B.H. Jones, National Livestock Feeders Association). The drive to reduce the cost of livestock
continued and by 1973 the ten major meat packers bought more than three-quarters of their
slaughter cattle, hogs, sheep and lambs directly from the feeder. Id. at 71. In 1976 the United
States Department of Agriculture estimated that packers buy well over 80% of all livestock for
slaughter from "country sources," i.e., directly from the feeders. H.R. REP, No. 932, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Cone CONG. & AD. News 3749, 3752.
21 Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 55 (statement of John Heath).
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erally is financed by a local bank or credit association. 23 Depending on the
particular rancher's general financial stability," these lenders may take a
mortgage (security interest)" in the rancher's property. The feeder pays
the rancher by check or draft." Apparently these payment and financing
arrangements at the beginning of' the chain have created no serious prob-
lems. 27
Problems do begin, however, at the next step in the process, the
feeder-packer link in the chain. Many feeders are small family operations
which sell their whole year's production at one time to one buyer. They
must sell when the livestock is ready and the market seems favorable."
There are two methods of determining the price of the cattle. First, the
packer may buy the cattle "on the hoof" which means the price is de-
termined by the live weight of the cattle when the cattle is delivered to the
packer." In the alternative, in a buyer's market, the cattle feeders may sell
"grade and yield," as the plaintiff cattle sellers did in the Samuels case. This
method postpones the determination of the price until the packer
slaughters the livestock, chills the carcasses for approximately 24 hours,
and the United States Department of Agriculture Inspector grades the car-
casses.30 The packer must pay the cattle seller the amount fixed on the
business day after the price is seta' by the carcass weight and the grade de-
termined by the Department of Agriculture Inspector. Whatever pricing
method is used, the packer is required by the Packers and Stockyards Act
of 192 1 to make "prompt payment" for the livestock purchased for slaugh-
ter."
Where and how do the meat packers get the money to pay the cattle
sellers? Since they must tender "prompt payment" to the sellers long before
they have sold and received payment for the meat they process and pack-
age, packers need financing. They therefore borrow the money from
banks, finance companies and other short term lenders. These lenders
almost always ask packers to mortgage their assets as security for their
loans. 33 In the language of the Uniform Commercial Code, the packers
23 Interview with Randy Cox, rancher, Great Falls, Montana (February 14, 1977) (notes
on file with the author); ROBERTSON & WILLET, THE KOLII OF ARIZONA BANKS IN SUPPLYING
CREDIT TO ARIZONA'S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, Report No. 3, Dept. of Agricultural Economics,
University of Arizona 4, 8, 41 (1974); THE KANSAS NEBRASKA CATTLE FFIEDLOT INDUSTRY-
FEEDER CAT'T'LE PROCUREMENT PRACTICES AND OPERATION CHARACTERISTICS, Contribution No.
547, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station 9, 11 (1975).
24 Interview with Randy Cox, rancher, Great Falls, Montana (February 9, 1977).
23 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
28 Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 37 (statement of Virgil Huseman,
Kansas Livestock Association).
27
28 Hearings on S. 1532, supra note 4, at 46 (statement of Mrs. Jerry Corey).
28 Weaver, supra note 2.
38 Record Appendix at 23, Stowers v. Mahon, No. 73-1185 (5th Cir. 1973) (Findings of
Fact by Elmore Whitehurst, Referee in Bankruptcy) [hereinafter cited as Record Appendix].
See also Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970); 9 C.F.R. lIft 201.43,
201.99 (1976).
31 9 C.F.R. § 201.43(b) (1976). The parties may expressly agree otherwise before the
purchase.
32 Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 201 el seq. (1970). See text at notes
68-69 infra for a fuller explanation of the term "prompt payment," and the governing
regulations.
33 Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 38.
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thereby give their lenders a "security interest"34 in the packers' assets.
These assets consist of accounts receivable, 35 inventory,36 and equipment.37
if the packer becomes economically unstable or fails, and is unable to pay
back the loans or is "in default" under the terms of the loan agreement be-
tween the packer and lender, the lender can obtain repayment by taking
possession of the packers' assets."
Lending institutions require security for their loans to packers for two
reasons: the uncertainty of packers' making money, and the enormous
amount of money packers must borrow to operate. 36 The uncertainty arises
from the fact that packers' earnings fluctuate widely in response to supply
and demand relationships between the producers (ranchers and feeders) of
beef on the one hand and the consumers (hotels, restaurants, supermarkets
and eaters) of beef on the other. The industry is highly competitive and
operates on a margin of less than one percent of sales." Since 1960, one
hundred sixty-seven American beef packers out of nine hundred have gone
bankrupt.'" The packers' need for money arises from the legal requirement
that they make prompt payment to feeders. The packer is required by law
to pay for livestock by the business day after the purchase or the business
day following determination of final grade and yield. 42 However, the pack-
ers themselves are not paid for an average of sixteen days after the pur-
chase period." This waiting period is called the "float." As a result of the
float, packers must borrow enough to finance their accounts receivable for
at least sixteen days to provide the money to pay for the cattle purchases
until the packers' customers in turn pay their bills. 44 With the packers' nar-
row profit margin, this need can be great. Packers require forty percent
more cash when the price paid for cattle is fifty cents a pound than they do
when it is twenty-five cents a pound. A swing of fifteen cents per pound
31
 U.C.C.	 1-201(37).
15
 An "account receivable" is money owed to the packers by their customers. U.C.C. §
9-106.
se U.C.C. § 9-109(4) defines "inventory" as goods held for sale "or if they are raw mate-
rials ... or materials used or consumed in a business."
37 U.C.C. § 9-109(2) defines "equipment" as goods used or bought for use primarily in a
business (including farming or a profession). The Code definitions of "goods" in §§ 2-105 and
9-105(1)(I) include animals.
U.C.C. § 9-503. Since one cannot literally take possession of an account receivable,
the Code provides that the lender may notify the packers' customers to pay the lender di-
rectly. U.C.C. § 9-502(1).
3a
 Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 51-53 (statement of John Heath,
Illini Beef Packers, Inc.).
40 1d.
4 ' Hearings on H.R. 8410, supra note 3, at 62, 64 (statement of Bruce B. Wilson, U.S.
Dept. of Justice).
" 9 C.F.R. § 201.43(6)(1976). See text at notes 68-69 infra.
43 Hearings on H,R. 8410, supra note 3, at 24 (statement of William H. Heubaum, Iowa
Beef Processors); Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 51-53 (statement of John
Heath, Mini Beef Packers, Inc.).
41
 A representative of the beef packers gave the following example:
Assuming a given live cattle market, Illini Beef paid $500,000 for 1,300
cattle the day it opened. It paid the same amount the next day and so on until 16
days had passed.
Then, theoretically, on the 17th day, $500,000 came in as collections on
outstanding receivables which matched the $500,000 paid for live cattle on that
day.
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thus can dramatically increase the packers' need for credit.'" It is, therefore
not surprising that lending institutions minimize their risks by almost
always making only secured loans to packers.
Packers have their own devices for reducing the economic pressure
created by the float and yet at the same time satisfying the technical legal
requirements of "prompt payment." They carefully take advantage of
postal holidays and the general slowness of the postal system. They fre-
quently pay by checks issued on remote banks to extend collection time.
These devices operate to delay the packers' actual payment to feeders.
Customers of packers have no legal constraints on the time of their
payments for meat. Thus, they pay packers' invoices when their own cash
position makes it comfortable to do so. The supermarket customer pays
cash, but the supermarkets take seven to twenty-one clays to pay the meat
wholesaler. The restaurant goer frequently pays by credit card and the
credit card organizations do not settle for seven to twenty days. The gov-
ernment does not pay the wholesaler for thirty to ninety days. Hotels, air-
lines, and other institutions also do not settle promptly. The wholesalers
and other institutions which buy directly from the packers pass these delays
back to the packers. Since packers often are able to pass some of the delay
on to the cattle sellers despite "prompt payment" laws and regulations,"
the cattle seller who has been relying innocently for protection on the
Packers and Stockyards Act, on simple honesty, and on common knowledge
that a check is as good as cash, is, effectively, supplying unsecured financ-
ing to the packers. And when a packer such as Samuels fails, the cattle sel-
lers are left holding the dishonored checks.
C. The Samuels Litigation
The plaintiffs in the Samuels litigation were fifteen cattle sellers who
sold live cattle to Samuels & Co. for slaughter. Samuels & Co. was a large
Texas meat packing company with weekly sales from its various plants gen-
erally totalling a million dollars.'" Its principal financer for six years was
C.I.T. 48 C.I.T. made weekly loans to Samuels and took a security interest in
all Samuels' real estate fixtures, machinery, inventory and accounts receiv-
able owned at the time of the agreement and acquired thereafter."
Samuels' inventory included livestock, carcasses, packaged and unpackaged
meat. 5 °
From May 12 to May 23, 1969, the fifteen plaintiff cattle sellers sold
and delivered cattle to Samuels & Co. at their slaughtering plant in Mount
Cash flow balance had been achieved, but also $8 million in financing had
been utilized. If $2 million came from company funds—the percentage a well-
financed beef slaughterer might have initially—then $6 million came from len-
ders, a sizeable chunk considering the company may have only $12 million in
total assets.
Hearings on S. 1532 (Amend. 1060), supra note 4, at 52 (statement of John Heath).
45 1d. at 51-53.
40 See text at note 68 infra,
47 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20.
4 " 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (1976),
" Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20, 25-26.
"Id. at 25-26.
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Pleasant, Texas on a grade and yield basis." After the price was de-
termined, Samuels & Co. issued checks to the sellers totalling $54,793.26. 52
On May 23, 1969, C.1.T., "deeming itself to be insecure," refused to
give Samuels a weekly advance of $184,000 needed to continue Samuels'
operations and began to liquidate its outstanding loans to Samuels. 53
Samuels & Co. filed a Chapter XI petition for reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act54
 later that day, and an operating receiver was appointed. 55
The checks issued to the fifteen cattle sellers immediately were stamped
"no sufficient funds" and returned unpaid. The attempt to reorganize was
unsuccessful and on April 30, 1970, Samuels & Co., Inc., was adjudicated a
bankruptcy
At that time, Samuels owed C.I.T. more than $1,800,000," and none
of the sellers had been paid for his or her livestock." The bankruptcy trus-
tee indicated that the general unsecured creditors would receive nothing on
their claims." On May 20, 1970, to avoid classification as general un-
secured creditors, the cattle sellers filed a petition with the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas "for cattle sellers to re-
claim property or payment."6 °
This was not an unusual confrontation in an unstable economy.
Samuels, the packer-debtor, went bankrupt and the creditors, C.I.T. and
sellers, were fighting literally over the bones and carcasses. The cattle sel-
lers operated on a small margin, expected prompt payment, did not agree
to take any risks of the packer's business and did not include any risk calcu-
lations in their prices. The secured lender, C.I.T., extended huge amounts
of credit, minimized its risk by taking a security interest in everything and
expected to be able to recover all of the money it had loaned. The bank-
rupt, Samuels, expected to be able to cover its own checks to the sellers
with its weekly advance from C.I.T. C.I.T., after its careful weekly scrutiny .
of Samuels & Co.'s balance sheet, decided to minimize its losses and
stopped supplying credit.
These were the economic realities underlying the legal confrontation
in Samuels. Part II will analyze how the law classifies the conflicting in-
terests, and the various ways in which these classifications affect the resolu-
tion of the confrontation.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTES
The extensive litigation which purported to resolve the conflict in
Samuels illustrates the difficulty of adapting broad general legal rules to
complex and specific economic transactions. Priority between the two com-
peting creditors, the cattle sellers and C.I.T., is entirely dependent on the
legal classification of these creditors' interests. There are several possible
" Id. at 24.
"Id. at 23.
"Id. at 20.
" 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
" Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 21.
"Id.
"Id. at 26.
5° Id. at 22.
"Id. at 21.
"Id. at 22.
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statutory classifications which are found in the Packers and Stockyards Act
of 1921 "regulating interstate commerce in livestock and livestock prod-
ucts,"" and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 specifically Article 2 gov-
erning the sale of goods, and Article 9 63 regulating security interests in
personal property. 64
To determine the proper classification, the relevant, often conflicting,
sections of each statute must be analyzed. Each statute will be examined
separately, and their labyrinthian interaction traced.
A. The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921
The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (PSA) 65 is a federal statute
passed to give the Secretary of Agriculture close supervisory powers over
the purchase and sale of livestock at the major terminal markets." Samuels
& Co., Inc., was a packer subject to the PSA and the regulations thereun-
der as a "person engaged in the business (a) of buying livestock in com-
merce for the purposes of slaughter, or (b) of manufacturing or preparing
meats or meat food products for sale or shipment in commerce."'
In 1964 the regulations promulgated pursuant to the PSA were
amended as follows:
b) Purchasers to pay promptly for livestock. Each packer, market
agency or dealer purchasing livestock shall, before the close of
the next business day following the purchase of livestock and the
determination of the amount of the purchase price, transmit or de-
liver to the seller or his duly authorized agent the full amount of the
'17	 §§ 181 et seq. (1970).
82 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. I §§ 1-101 et seq. (Vernon 1967).
63 U.C.C. §§ 9-101 et seq. (1962 version). After commencement of litigation in In re
Samuels & Co., Texas adopted the 1972 revisions to Article 9 of U.C.C., 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
§§ 9.101-9.507 (1974) codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. I ft§ 9.101 et seq. (Vernon
Supp. Vol. 3, 1976). Since these changes are not relevant to this discussion, all references to
U.C.C. Article 9 are to the 1962 version unless otherwise indicated.
' 4 In addition to the above-mentioned sources of law, the Samuels case also involved is-
sues under the Bankruptcy Act. Samuels & Co. filed a petition on May 23, 1969 under Chap-
ter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20-28. This is essentially an
arrangement by which a debtor's business can continue to operate under the supervision of
the court. II U.S.C. §§ 714, 732, 742 (1970). The packing company continued to operate
under a court appointed receiver. Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 21. It appears that the
cattle sellers believed that since Samuels' business was continuing under the direction of the
court appointed receiver, they were not obligated to make a demand for reclamation. See Brief
for Appellant at 19, Stowers v. Mahon, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973); Brief for Appellant at 5,
Stowers v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
Efforts to rehabilitate the company were unsuccessful. Samuels & Co. was declared a
bankrupt on April 30, 1970 and a trustee was appointed. Record Appendix, supra note 30, at
21.
This article will not discuss the important Bankruptcy Act implications of the case, since
the trustee did not assert any claim to the property in dispute on behalf of the estate.
es 7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970).
'° The chief evil feared is the monopoly of the packers, enabling them unduly
and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper who sells, and unduly and arbitrar-
ily to increase the price to the consumer who buys. Congress thought that the
power to maintain this monopoly was aided by control of the stockyards.
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 51445 (1922). For the historical events leading up to the
passage of the PSA, see id. at 497-503.
61 7 U.S.C. § 191 (1970); Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20, 23.
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purchase price, unless otherwise expressly agreed between the par-
ties before the purchase of the livestock."
The amendment was designed "to establish a uniform rule regarding pay-
ment for livestock purchased by packers, market agencies and dealers con-
sistent with (1) the established custom that sales of livestock are on a cash
basis ....""
In 1968 the regulations were again amended by adding detailed pro-
cedures for determining the price to packers of livestock by carcass grade,
carcass weight or carcass grade and weight." The regulations provide that
"[e]ach packer ... shall maintain the identity of each seller's livestock and
the carcasses therefrom and shall, after the determination of the amount of
the purchase price, transmit or deliver to the seller ... [a detailed written
account and explanation of the] final account.""
The Samuels case presented the question whether these PSA reg-
ulations give cattle sellers a "special" 72 kind of interest in the cattle sold that
takes priority over an earlier Code security interest thereby giving the sel-
lers priority over C.I.T. in the money realized from Samuels & Co.'s sale of
the carcasses. If such an interest were created by the PSA the cattle sellers
would be entitled to recover the amount of their unpaid checks out of
monies which C.I.T. otherwise could claim as proceeds from inventory or
accounts receivable subject to its security interest under the Code. If the
PSA creates this type of priority, then C.I.T.'s Article 9 security interest
would be subordinated to the special interest of the cattle sellers.
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
If the PSA does not determine the priority issue," the question is
whether the Code imposes a statutory solution. The first step in this Code
analysis is to select the controlling article of the Code by examining how .
the Code classifies the competing interests of C.I.T., the unpaid financer,
and the unpaid cattle sellers.
It is perfectly clear that any enforceable interest of C.I.T., the secured
lender, is an Artide 9 security interest. The classification of the interest of
the unpaid cattle sellers, however, is not at all clear. There are three pos-
sibilities:
(1) The interest of the cattle sellers is an unperfected purchase money
security interest" under Article 9;
(2) the interest of the cattle sellers is the Article 2 right of an unpaid
credit seller to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer;" or,
68 9 C.F.R. § 201.43(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
6 ° Id. at § 201.43(c).
" Id. at § 201.99.
7 ' Id.
72 Samuels & Co., inc. v. Mahon, 483 F.2d 557. 559-60 (5th Cir. 1973).
"See Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100, 107 (1974) (Court expressly held that PSA does
not determine the priority issue in this case).
" U.C.C. § 9-107 reads in part: "A security interest is a 'purchase money security in-
terest' to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price ...."
7° U.C.C, §§ 2-702(2), (3). See text at notes 109-15 infra.
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(3) the sellers' interest is the Article 2 right of an unpaid cash seller to
reclaim goods from a buyer who fails to make payment."
The Code's classification of the cattle sellers' interest is of critical im-
portance. If the sellers' interest is classified as an Article 9 unperfected
purchase money security interest, C.I.T. undoubtedly will prevail. If their
interest is classifed as the right of an unpaid credit or cash seller to reclaim
the goods, the sellers may prevail. However, their right to the goods would
still be subordinate to C.I.T.'s interest if C.I.T. is a subsequent good faith
purchaser for value who acquired title to the goods from the defaulting
buyer, Samuels. 77
I. C.I.T.'s Article 9 Security Interest
In return for weekly "advances" Samuels gave C.I.T. the right, in the
event of default, to take possession of Samuels' fixtures, machinery, in-
ventory, accounts receivables and proceeds." This is an institutionalized
type of financing which in pre-Code days was called a chattel mortgage and
assignment" and which tinder Article 9 is classified as giving C.I.T. a secu-
rity interest in Samuels' property." The security agreements' between
C.I.T. and Samuels & Co. gave C.I.T. a security interest in property owned
by Samuels at the time of the agreement but also contained an after ac-
quired property clauses 2 that provided for a security interest in property
acquired at anytime after the date of the agreement."
However, simply because a creditor has a security interest in a debt-
or's property, does not make that interest enforceable. A secured creditor
cannot enforce its security interest until it has "attached"" to specific prop-
erty of the debtor. A security interest attaches when three events have
7°
	 § 2-507(2); Comment 3, § 2-511(3). See text to notes 117-24 infra.
" U.C.C. § 2-403. See text at notes 125-43 infra.
Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20, 25-26.
79 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREsTs IN PERSONAL PROMO'S' § 11.2 (1965) thereinafter
cited as Gli.siouEl.
"° U.C.C. § 1-201(37) reads in part; " -Security Interest' means an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation ...." See Cit.-
MORE, supra note 79, at § 11.1.
"E "'Security Agreement' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h).
" Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20,
" U.C.C. §§ 9-204(3) and (4) state:
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) a security agreement may provide
that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the se-
curity agreement.
(4) No security attaches under an after-acquired property clause
(a) To crops which become such more than one year after the security
agreement is executed ... ;
(b) to consumer goods other than accessions (Section 9.314) when given as
additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after
the secured party gives value.
The interest described in U.C.C. § 9-204 is often referred to as a "continuing general lien,"
U.C.C. § 9.204, Comment 3, or as a "floating lien." Gu.moRE, supra note 79, at § 11.7.
" U.C.C. § 9-204(1) reads:
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection (3) of
Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the
collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have
taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
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taken place; (1) there is agreement that it attach; 85 (2) value is given by the
creditor; and (3) the debtor has rights in the collateral." Two of these
events clearly had occurred in Samuels. C.I.T. and Samuels & Co. had
created a security interest by an- agreement in writing—the requisite
agreement—and C.I.T. had loaned Samuels & Co. Money—the requisite
value. 87
 However, it is not clear whether the third requirement for "at-
tachment" was satisfied, since it is not certain that Samuels had acquired
rights in the collateral. 88
 This is a critical question in Samuels.
The term "rights in collateral" is not defined anywhere in the Code."
However, the term "collateral" is defined as "the property subject to a secu-
rity interest."90
 In Samuels, the property claimed by C.I.T. as collateral was
the unpaid for cattle. If Samuels & Co. had no interest in the cattle, it
U.C.C. § 1-201(3) reads in part: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this title ...."
Although U.C.C. § 9-204(1) refers specifically to the foregoing definition of an "agree-
ment," U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) provides that "(1) ... a security interest is not enforceable against
the debtor or third parties unless (a) ... the debtor has signed a security agreement which
contains a description of the collateral ...." Despite repeated attempts, the author has not
been able to obtain a copy of the signed agreement between C.I.T. and Samuels. However,
throughout the litigation the existence of such an agreement has been assumed and has not
been contested. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a finance company the size of C.I.T. would
advance an amount in excess of $1.8 million without a signed agreement.
In his findings of fact, Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20, Referee Elmore
Whitehurst stated that "[Samuels & Co., Inc.] operations were being financed by CAN. Cor-
poration which as security had taken an all encompassing lien on Samuels' real estate, fixtures,
machinery, inventory and accounts receivable." The Referee also found that
[alt all times material to this action C.I.T. Corporation (C.I.T.) was the holder of
a duly perfected security interest in all inventory owned by the bankrupt or
in which the bankrupt may have had an interest ... [and] in accounts receivable
of the bankrupt. At the time of filing of the Chapter X1 petition the bankrupt
was indebted to C.I.T. in an amount in excess of $1,800.000.
Id. at 25. Furthermore, in an order pursuant to a reclamation petition of C.I.T. Corp., Record
Appendix, supra note 30, at 42, the referee established a dollar amount of Samuels' indebted-
ness "in accordance with the agreements between C.1.T. Corporation and the Debtor ...." It
is interesting to note that no specific finding was made that a signed writing existed. This is
perhaps due to a mistaken view that the existence of a perfected security interest obviated the
necessity for a signed writing. The 1972 amendment to U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (adopted in
Texas by amendment in 1973, supra note 62), eliminates any confusion created by H 9.203
and 9-204. The confusion stemmed from the fact that under the two sections a creditor could
have an attached and duly perfected security interest which was unenforceable in the absence
of a written security agreement describing the collateral and signed by the debtor. The 1972
version of § 9-203 makes the signed writing a requirement of attachment so that a creditor
who has a duly perfected security interest now also has an enforceable interest. See § 9.203
for definition of perfection. This was accomplished by eliminating from § 9-204(1) the re-
ference to the Article 1 definition of an "agreement" and including the signed writing as a re-
quirement for attachment in § 9-203.
" U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
87 U.C.C. § 1-201(44) reads in part: "'Value.' Except as otherwise provided with respect
to negotiable instruments and bank collections ... a person gives 'value' for rights if he ac-
quires them ... (b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim
The referee in his findings of fact, Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 26, found that
"[alt the time of the filing of the Chapter XI petition the bankrupt was indebted to C.1.T. in
an amount in excess of $1,800,000."
" U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
" GILMORE, supra note 79, § 11.5.
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a).
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never acquired "rights in the collateral." Therefore C.I.T.'s security interest
would have nothing, to which it could attach, and CIT. would have no
claim under its security agreement to the money Samuels received for the
meat. if the cattle sellers retained sufficient rights in the unpaid for cattle
so that Samuels' interest did not rise to the status of "rights in the collat-
eral," then C.I.T.'s security interest in the cattle did not attach and hence
was not enforceable.
Assuming, however, Samuels & Co. had these mysterious "rights" in
the unpaid for cattle, then C.I.T. had an Article 9 security interest which
had attached to the cattle. C.I.T. could then enforce this security interest
against its debtor, Samuels & Co." C.I.T. had also given the necessary
statutory public notice of this interest by filing according to Article 9 re-
quirements.92 Therefore, its security interest, if it had attached, was also
"perfected."93
2. Cattle Sellers' Interest
As previously noted, there are a variety of possible Code classifications
that may cover the interest of the cattle sellers, The classification selected is
critical because it may determine which of the competing parties prevails.
a. Sellers' Interest as Unperfected Purchase Money Security Interest (Articles 2 . and
9)
One theory is that the cattle sellers' interest in the unpaid for cattle
was an unperfected Code purchase money security interest. A security in-
terest is a purchase money security interest if it is taken or retained by the
seller of the collateral to secure all or part of the price of goods sold." A
security interest is unperfected if no written agreement exists, if no attach-
ment has taken place, 95 or if no proper filing has been made." Article 9
U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203, 9-204.
52 The referee found that C.1.T. was the holder of a duly perfected security interest in
the inventory and accounts receivable of Samuels. Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 25.
U.C.C. 9-303 provides that a security interest is duly perfected when it has attached and
when all of the steps required for perfection have been taken. In the case of a nonpossessory
security interest, the step required is the filing of a financing statement. U.C.C. §§ 9-302,
9-304-306. In sections 9-401-403, the U.C.C. has adopted what is known as "notice filing,"
whereby in most cases the formal requirements of filing are limited to the filing of the address
of the secured party from whom information concerning the interest may be obtained, a
statement indicating what the collateral is, and the signatures of the debtor and the secured
party. This differs from the earlier "transaction filing" which required a complete description
of all collateral and of all the particular transactions involved. See GUMORE, supra note 79, §§
15.2, 15.3.
53 The effect of "perfection" of a security interest is to make that interest good as
against lien creditors of the debtor. The validity of a perfected security interest as against
other perfected security interests in the same property is determined by the priority provisions
of Article 9. "Perfection" does not necessarily mean, however, that the security interest is good
"against the world." See GiLmoRE„sukra note 79, , Introductory Note at 435.
54 U.C.C. § 9-107(a). The section reads:
A security interest is a "purchase' money security interest" to the extent
that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of
its price ....
n See note 84 supra.
vs U.C.C. § 9-303.
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provides that all attached, enforceable, properly recorded—that is, a duly
perfected—security interest has priority over an unperfected security in-
terest."
An Article 9 security interest normally is created by an agreement in
which a debtor gives its creditor a security interest in specific property to
insure payment of. the debt." When the cattle sellers sold the cattle to
Samuels & Co., they made no such agreement. They took checks as pay-
ment and assumed that the checks would not bounce." This transaction
appears to be a straight sale with no attempt to reserve any kind of security
interest. Under Pre-Code Texas law seller and buyer were 'presumed to in-
tend no passage of title until the check or draft was paid. If it were not
paid, the seller was entitled to reclaim the cattle or its proceeds from the
buyer or from subsequent purchasers such as C.I.T.'°°
Article 2 changes this result. Section 2-401 provides that:
insofar as situations are not covered by other provisions of this
Article and matters concerning title become material ... (1) ...
Any retention or reservation by the seller of title (property) in
goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation of a security interest ... (2) Unless otherwise
explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with respect to de-
.livery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest
Consistent with the Code's general treatment of the concept of title,'°' Ar-
" U.C.C. § 9-301, Comment I.
" U.C.C. § 9-102(1) reads in part:
(I) Except as otherwise provided ... this chapter applies so far as concerns
any personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper,
accounts or contract rights ....
U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment 1 points out that "[w]hen it is found that a security interest as de-
fined in Section 1-201(37) was intended, this article applies regardless of the form of the
transaction or the name by which the parties may have christened it."
9° In fact the checks would not have bounced if C.I.T. had not decided that it was eco-
nomically unwise to advance any more money to Samuels & Co. and failed to make its weekly
advance which would have been more than three times the amount of the checks outstanding
to the cattle sellers.
'" See, e.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1953) (Seller brought an
action to recover proceeds from third party buyer when the draft given to seller by buyer
went unpaid for lack of authority to draw. The court found under Texas law that in cash sales
title did not pass until the draft was paid and seller recovered.). But cf. Valley Stockyards v.
Kinsel, 369 S.W.2d 19, 27 (Tex. 1963) (Seller brought an action to recover proceeds from a
livestock company which purchased from buyer, a trader. The,court, in a 5-3 decision, re-
versed a summary judgment for seller on grounds that in a cash sale the presumption that
title does not pass until the draft is paid is rebuttable by a showing that the parties had a dif-
ferent intent.). See generally 2 S. WI tus-roN. THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON
LAW AND. UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 341-43, 346 (1948).
'°' The single most important innovation of Article 2 is its restatement of [the re-
sponsibilities of the parties to a contract] in terms of operative facts rather than
legal conclusions: where pre-Code law looked to "title" for the definition of rights
and remedies, the Code looks to demonstrable realities such as custody, control
and professional expertise.
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tick 2 makes it impossible for a seller of goods to retain "title" after the
goods have been delivered to the buyer unless explicitly agreed otherwise.
Any unilateral attempt to reserve title is transformed by this provision into
the reservation by the seller of a security interest.
Under section 9-113 this security interest
arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject to
the provisions of .. [Article 9] ... except that to the extent that
the debtor .. does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods .. .
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security in-
terest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are
governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2). 102
.Thus, although section 9-113 makes a section 2-401 security interest subject
to Article 9, it also creates an exception to this general rule in situations
where the defaulting debtor has not obtained lawful possession of the con-
tested goods. Accordingly, if Samuels & Co., by paying with checks that
were later dishonored, did not "lawfully obtain possession" of the cattle, the
Article 2 security interest of the cattle sellers would not be subject to those
requirements of Article 9 which are enumerated in section 9-113. The cat-
tle sellers' interest therefore would not be subordinated to the perfected se-
curity interest of C.I.T. by the priority rules of Article 9 103 because these
priority rules do not apply to an Article 2 security interest.
If, however, Samuels & Co. did obtain lawful possession of the cattle,
the cattle sellers' attempt to reserve title would be viewed as creating an Ar-
ticle 2 security interest, which is subject to Article 9. 1 ° 4 Since this security
interest was "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or
part of its price," 105 it would be classified by Article 9 as a purchase money
security interest. Moreover, since the cattle sellers did not follow Article 9's
filing requirements, their security interest would be unperfected.
An unperfected security interest is almost always subordinate to a per-
fected security interest in the same property. Therefore, if the transfer by
the cattle sellers to Samuels involved an attempted reservation of title—
thereby creating a section 2-401 security interest—if Samuels' possession
was lawful, and if C.1.T. had a perfected security interest, then C.I.T.
would prevail. 1 °0
Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Giods under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 201 (1973). See also G11-MORE, supra note 79,
at § 11.8. U.C.C. § 9-202 and the comment thereto made it plain that while "title" may have
application in the law for other purposes, the concept is not to be used in determining the
rights, obligations and remedies applicable to secured transactions under the Code.
Also consistent with the Code's bypassing of the "title" concept are §§ 2-326 and 2-327
dealing with consignment sales and the rights of creditors. Section 2-326 distinguishes between
the case where the goods are delivered for use and the case where the goods are delivered For
resale. In the former case, the buyer's creditors may only reach the goods after the buyer's ac-
ceptance, while in the latter case they may reach the goods while in the buyer's possession. In
the application of this section to the general creditors of the buyer, any words reserving title
to the seller are to be disregarded.
'02 U.C.C. § 9-113 (emphasis added).
' 1" U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-312.
1 " U.C.C. g§ 2-401, 9-113.
10 ' U.C.C. § 9-107. See note 94 supra.
"A See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-312.
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It follows from this analysis that the cattle sellers could have acquired
priority over C.I.T. simply by following the requirements of section
9-312(3). That section provides that a later purchase money security in-
terest' 07 in inventory always can achieve priority over all prior conflicting
non-purchase money security interests in the same property if proper filing
is made and notice given to the other secured parties.'° 8
b. Sellers' Interest as Right to Reclaim the Goods (Article 2)
Another theory is that the cattle sellers' interest is not an attempted
reservation of title which the Code calls a security interest, but an Article 2
right to reclaim the goods for nonpayment. There are two distinct and dif-
ferent kinds of sellers' rights to reclaim unpaid for goods depending upon
whether the sellers are classified as credit sellers or cash sellers.
i) Credit Sellers: Right to Reclaim as Unpaid Credit Seller
A credit seller's right to reclaim unpaid for goods is based on and lim-
ited by section 2-702(2). This section provides that "[w]here a seller dis-
covers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent, he may
reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after receipt. "109
However, the section further provides that if the buyer has made "a mis-
representation of solvency" in writing to the seller within three months be-
fore delivery, the ten day limitation does not apply.
In order to be a credit seller under section 2-702(2), a seller must
meet three requirements. First, the buyer must have received the goods on
credit. In Samuels, the question arises whether the lapse of time between
the delivery of the cattle to Samuels and the determination of the price and
issuance of the check to the cattle sellers mandated by the "grade and
yield" procedure made the sale a credit sale as a matter of law. If the time
lapse did not have this effect, a further question arises whether the sub-
sequent dishonor of the checks "defeat[ing] payment""° transformed the
sale from a cash to a credit sale."'
1 ° 7
 U.C.C. § 9-107. See note 94 supra.
'" A seller always could get an absolute priority over a prior secured party by following
the specific provisions of Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(c) (2), (3) would have required sellers to
give C.I.T. notice before Samuels & Co. took delivery of the cattle, a harsh requirement in the
face of established practice. The policy behind the purchase money security priority is to en-
sure that the Code's expanded floating lien provisions will not have the effect of prohibiting
modernization by cutting off any subsequent financing with a new lender once a debtor has
given a lien on after-acquired property for a prior loan. It should be noted, however, that the
purchase money security priority has not been limited to the case of financing new equipment.
See Guamostf.supra note 79, at § 11.7.
1 °' U.C.C. § 2-702(2). Section 1-201 defines an insolvent as a person "who either has
ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they be-
come due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. §
1-201(23).
"° U.C.C. § 2-511(3) and Comment 4. See also 3-802.
"'Several courts have suggested that in some circumstances a sale negotiated as a cash
sale might be transformed into a credit sale. It is not dear, however, what would cause such a
transformation. In In rt Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974), restaurant
equipment was delivered to Colacci's restaurant in a cash sale. When the restauranteur could
not pay, the seller left the equipment and returned frequently for payment over a four month
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The second requirement of section 2-702(2) is that seller must have
demanded reclamation of the goods within ten days after their receipt, un-
less the buyer made a written misrepresentation of solvency to the seller
within three months before delivery. In these circumstances, the ten day
limitation does not apply." 2 There is no evidence in the Samuels case of any
demand made by cattle sellers upon the receiver within ten days of
Samuels' receipt of their cattle, or at any other time prior to tiling suit
eleven months later. However, the cattle sellers conceivably could have
escaped the time limits imposed by this section by arguing that the bad
checks were written misrepresentations of solvency. Hence the sellers would
be absolved from meeting the ten day requirement. 13
Section 2-702(2)'s third requirement is that the seller reclaim the
"goods" which were the subject of the credit sale. The goods in Samuels
were cattle which were transformed and resold in a short time. Further,
period before reclaiming the equipment. The court recognized that the sale was negotiated as
a cash sale, but treated the seller as a credit seller. id. at 1123. It is unclear whether the trans-
action became a credit sale on the facts because of the conduct of the seller or as a matter of
law because the seller waived his right of reclamation under U.C.C. § 2-507(2) and Comment
3. In any case, the mere fact that the buyer did not pay does not seem to be sufficient cause to
transform the sale as a matter of law from a cash sale to a credit sale. See also In re Richardson
Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. REP. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1975). Although on the facts, the sale in-
volved appeared to be a cash sale, the court denied recovery to an unpaid seller seeking to re-
claim against buyer's trustee in bankruptcy because seller had not made demand for reclama-
tion within the ten day period of U.C.C. § 2-702 (dealing with credit seller). Id. at 387. Seller
had based his action on U.C.C. § 2-507 (dealing with cash seller) but the court did not discuss
the issue of whether the sale was a cash or credit sale. But .see Ranchers & Farmers Livestock
Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (dealing with cash
seller).
'" U.C.C. § 2.702(2) provides in full:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while in-
solvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular sell-
er in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not
apply. Except as provided in this subsection the.seller may not base a right to re-
claim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency
or of intent to pay.
Id.
"'The theory that checks could be "written misrepresentations of solvency" within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 2-702(2) was set out in dicta in Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust
& Savings Bank, 103 III. App. 2d. 190, 195, 242 N.E. 2d 911, 915 (1068). Plaintiff brewing
company was not allowed to escape from the § 2-702(2) ten day limitation for reclamation by
claiming that defendant's check was a misrepresentation of solvency because plaintiff had not
relied on the check in determining its course of dealing with defendant. Id. There was a fac-
tual showing that plaintiff' knew independently of the check that defendant was insolvent at
the time of the sale. /d. This theory was held to be inapplicable to the facts in In re Creative
Buildings, Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974) and In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. REP, 828,
830 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
However, in Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir.
1974), the court permitted the seller to reclaim from the pipeline company (Amoco) on the
basis of the buyer's having made a misrepresentation of solvency in the form of checks given
to the seller on a prior sale. The seller relied on the checks in making a further sale to the
buyer and when, after delivery of the oil to Amoco, the checks relied on were returned un-
paid, the seller promptly notified Amoco to stop delivery. Id. at 117.
The import of these cases appears to be that a check may be a written misrepresenta-
tion of solvency under § 2-702(2) only if seller can make a factual showing that in determining
its course of dealings in the sale in question, it relied on a check given in payment for a sale
which occurred within three months of the sale in question.
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these cattle were sold by court order." 4 Thus, there was little opportunity
to reclaim the goods themselves. The question therefore is whether a credit
seller's right to reclaim goods extends to a right to reclaim the proceeds of
the sale of the goods.
If the transaction in Samuels was a credit sate, if the checks were writ-
ten misrepresentations of solvency, and if the sellers' right to reclaim ex-
tends to the proceeds, then the cattle sellers had a right to reclaim under
section 2-702(2). However, that section further provides that such reclama-
tion "is subject to the rights of a ... good faith purchaser under this Article
(Section 2-403)." 115 Therefore, as a final point, it must be noted that the
cattle sellers' right to reclaim as credit sellers would be subordinate to the
rights of a good faith purchaser for value." 6 C.I.T.'s status as a good faith
purchaser for value will be discussed in a later section.
ii) Cash Seller: Rights to Reclaim as Unpaid Cash Sellers
Unlike the fairly straightforward delineation of the rights of the
credit seller in section 2-702(2), there is no express provision in the Code
giving a comparable right to reclaim to the cash seller. However, the courts
seem to have relied on Sections 2-51 1(3), 2-507 and Comment 3 to section
2-507 as authority for granting that right.'" These sections, dealing with
cash sales, provide:
Section 2-511(3)	 [Playment by check is conditional and is de-
feated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due
presentment.
Section 2-507(2). Where payment is due and demanded on the
'" The referee found as a fact that "tats a matter of necessity arrangements had to be
worked out for the trustee under the direction of the court to sell the perishable meat on
hand with proceeds to be held subject to the order of the court so that these contests could be
fount (sic) out over money." Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 21.
Citing no case precedent, Judge Godbold contended in the Fifth Circuit en bane opin-
ion in Samuels v. Mahon, 526 F.2d at 1245:
Moreover, § 2.507 and § 2.702 speak-of a right to reclaim goods. Neither provi-
sion grants a right to go after proceeds of these goods. Where aright or interest
in proceeds is recognized by the Code it is recognized expressly. See, e.g., § 9.306.'
The right granted by § 2.507 is narrowly defined. I am unwilling to imply an ex-
tension to such a shortlived and precisely drawn remedy.
ln the cases where the problem has arisen, recovery of proceeds has been permitted,
without discussion of the proceeds question, where recovery of the goods was not possible. See
In re Mort Co., 209 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Reclamation petitioner claimed money which
trustee received for goods sold by the petitioner to the bankrupt two days before the bankrupt
flied a voluntary petition. The bankrupt had paid for the goods upon delivery by a check
which was dishonored. The petitioner, who had claimed within the ten day limit, was allowed
to recover under § 2-507(2). Id. at 316: See also Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil, 490
F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974); In re American Food. Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. 436, 441
(N.D. Ga. 1974) (seller permitted to recover cases of fish sold to the bankrupt or the proceeds
of any goods which had already been sold).
"5
 U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
16 U.C.C. § 2-403(1) gives a good faith purchaser for value from a defaulting buyer
superior rights to those of an unpaid cash or credit seller. Therefore, if it is concluded that
the cattle sellers have a right to reclaim the key question in this case becomes whether C.I.T. is
a good faith purchaser for value.
'" See, e.g., In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968); in re Mort
Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Lawrence v. Graham, 349 A.2d 271 (Md. App. 1975).
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delivery to the buyer of the goods or documents of title, his right
as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional
upon his making the payment due.
Comment 3 to Section 2-507 states that the ten day limitation "within which
the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is
also applicable here." This comment assumes that the language of the stat-
ute clearly implies a right to reclaim by a cash seller where the payment
that is "due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer" is not made. This
implication is further supported by Section 2-703(0 which gives a seller a
right to "cancel" where the buyer "fails to make a payment due on or be-
fore delivery.""" However, the statement in the comment that the ten day
limitation explicitly imposed on the credit seller's right to reclaim applies to
cash sellers, though relied on by some courts,"° has no basis in the statute
itself.
If the ten day limitation does not bar the cattle sellers' exercise of
their right to reclaim, it is necessary to consider whether the "grade and
yield" sale procedure meets the statutory definition of a cash sale. The
issue is whether in the transaction between the cattle sellers and Samuels &
Co. "payment (was) due and demanded on delivery to the buyer of the
goods."' 2 ° It could be argued that the PSA makes grade and yield cash
sales impossible because payment is delayed for at least a day. "On de-
livery" is about as unequivocal as statutory language ever gets and a pay-
ment twenty-four hours later is not "on delivery." The cash sale concept
already has been stretched to encompass goods paid for by check, but to
classify this transaction, where checks were issued several days later, as a
cash sale extends that concept to a point where it becomes very difficult to
distinguish cash sales from credit sales.
However, the referee in bankruptcy found as a fact that the sale of
the cattle was a cash sale."' This finding in addition to the fact. that the
lapse of time between delivery of the cattle and issuance of the checks was
mandated by the PSA regulations' 22 must be considered in determining
whether the transaction was on a cash basis. Further, the referee found
that sale of livestock on a grade and yield basis was a recognized custom
and usage in the trade.' 23
"8
 The confusing definition of "cancellation" in § 2-106(4) as having the same "effect"
as termination questions whether the right to cancel provides a basis for reclamation of goods.
"" In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1968) (Expressly relying
on Comment 3 to U.C.C. fi 2-507 and the § 2-507 cross reference to § 2-702, the court denied
recovery to cash seller because he failed to demand reclamation within ten days.); In re Kirk
Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. REP. 746, 748 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (Court denied recovery for failure to
reclaim within ten days. Discussed and adopted Helms Veneer rationale that Comment 3 to §
2.507 is intended as a cross reference to § 2-702.). See also In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309,
310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (Court allowed cash seller to recover under § 2-507 without discussion
of ten day limit where seller had made demand for reclamation within ten days); In re
Richardson Homes, 18 U.C.C. RiT, 384 (W.D. lnd, 1975) (Court is unclear as to whether
plaintiff is cash or credit seller); Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State
Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (court is unclear as to status of seller). See gener-
ally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF SALES § 165, 166 (1970).
1 " U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (emphasis added).
1Y'
	 Appendix, supra note 30, at 23.
122 See text at notes 68-71 supra.
1 " Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 23.
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As in the discussion of a credit seller's right to reclaim, it is necessary
to determine whether a cash seller's right to reclaim goods extends to a
right to reclaim the proceeds. If it is concluded that the cattle sellers had a
right as cash sellers to reclaim the proceeds, the question is reached again
as to the status of this right to reclaim vis-a-vis a third party, C.I.T. The
Code speaks of a buyer's, Samuels & Co.'s, "right as against the seller to re-
tain or dispose of' the goods being "conditional on payment." 124 Comment
3 states that "these words are used as words of limitation to conform with
the policy set forth in the bona fide purchaser sections of this Article." As
with their status as credit sellers, then, the status of the cattle sellers' right
to reclaim as cash sellers against C.I.T. will depend on C.I.T.'s rights under
Section 2-403 as a good faith purchaser for value.
3. C.1.T.'s Status as a Good Faith Purchaser for Value (Article 2)
Section 2-403 consolidates prior statutory and case law "to state a uni-
fied and simplified policy on good faith purchase of goods." 125
 This section
provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his trans-
feror had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a
limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest
purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have
been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser
has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the pur-
chaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale,"
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.
Under this section, Samuels presents two sets of questions. The first is
the nature of the title which Samuels & Co. had to the cattle. If Samuels &
Co. obtained either good or voidable title to the cattle and did so under a
transaction of purchase, section 2-403 allows Samuels & Co. to transfer
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. However, if Samuels & Co.
never obtained title to the cattle or if the transaction between Samuels &
Co. and the cattle sellers was not a purchase, then Samuels & Co. did not
have the power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser. If Samuels
& Co. did in fact have a good or voidable title to the cattle, then the second
question arises: whether C.I.T. was a good faith purchaser for value under
section 2-403. If C.I.T. is not a good faith purchaser for value, its interest
in the cattle will be subordinated to the cattle sellers' rights as cash or credit
sellers to reclaim the proceeds from the sale of the cattle.
'" U.C.C. 11 2-507(2) (emphasis added).
"s U.C.C. * 2-403, Comment, Purposes of Changes. For background on the develop-
ment of the concept of good faith purchase in the law of sales and its relation to cash and
credit sales, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 VALE L.J. 1057,
1057-62 (1954).
or,
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a. Samuels & Co.'s Ability to Transfer Good Title to C.I.T.
Before C.I.T. can recover as a good faith purchaser for value, it must
be determined that Samuels & Co. had the power to transfer good title to
the cattle under 2-403(1). Section 2-403(1) confers this power upon "[a]
person with voidable title" and provides that "[w]hen goods have been deliv-
ered under a transaction if purchase the purchaser has such power even
though ... b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dis-
honored, or c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale'
...." 126 Under this section, the first question is whether Samuels & Co. was
capable of transferring good title as a "person with voidable title." The
Code does not define "voidable title." Section 2-403(1)(b) nevertheless
explicitly covers Samuels & Co.'s sale of cattle because Samuels took de-
livery of the cattle "in exchange for a check which was later dishonored."'"
Section 2-403(1)(6) may describe one transaction in a nonexclusive list of
transactions which confer voidable title on a transferor. Alternatively, the pro-
vision may be one in an exclusive list of transactions in which a transferor
whose title is void nevertheless has the power to transfer good title. In
either case, Samuels & Co. would have had the power to transfer good title
to C.I.T.
If section 2-403(1) is construed as a list of those with void title who
can convey good title, it can be argued that the transaction in Samuels is not
a "transaction of purchase." Section 1-201(32) defines a transaction of pur-
chase as a "voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." Argu-
ably, the sale of cattle to Samuels & Co. did not create an interest in prop-
erty because the cattle were delivered in exchange for checks which the
buyer knew would be dishonored. Lacking the buyer's intent to pay for the
goods the contract was without an essential formal element and was void ab
initio. If there were no agreement between Samuels and the sellers, the
transaction was not a purchase and Samuels did not have the power to
transfer good title to C.I.T. even if C.I.T. were a good faith purchaser for
value.
b. C./. T.'s "Good Faith"
If Samuels & Co. had the power to transfer good title to the cattle to
C.I.T., it is necessary to consider whether C.I.T. was a good faith pur-
chaser for value under 2-403. The Code defines good faith subjectively as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" 128 and objectively
in the case of a merchant as "the observance of reasonable commercial
"° U.C.C. 2-403(1) (emphasis added).
"'It might be argued that the real meaning of this sentence is that these situations are
covered only when the transferor (Samuels & Co.) has voidable title and thus other state law
would then determine the nature of transferor's title. This is a weak argument in view of the
intent expressed in the comments. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 221-22
n.70 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Peters]. Gilmore describes voidable title as "a vague idea,
never defined, and perhaps incapable of definition, whose greatest virtue as a principle of
growth may well have been its shapeless imprecision of outline." Gilmore, The Commercial Doc-
trine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1059 (1953).
1R° U.C.C. g 1-201(19).
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standards of fair dealing in the trade."'" Because it held itself out as hav-
ing knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices involved in the financing
transaction, C.17. would be held to the good faith standard applicable to a
merchant.' 3° In Samuels, the determination of C.I.T.'s good faith depends
on the weight given to its close knowledge of Samuels & Co.'s financial af-
fairs and on its awareness that failure to make its regular weekly advánce to
Samuels & Co. might result in the dishonor of Samuels' outstanding checks
to cattle sellers.'"
c. C.I.T. as a "Purchaser"
The Code definition of purchase is broad, encompassing "taking by
sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or
any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." 132 This
definition seems broad enough to include a secured creditor whose interest
in its debtor's property is created by agreement. Courts, relying on this def-
inition of purchase, consistently have treated secured parties as Code pur-
chasers.' 33
120
 A merchant is one who "by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
' 3° See id. § 2-104, Comment 2.
' 3 ' U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (b). See Sherrock v. Comm. Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 650.51
(Del. 1972) (nothing in the Code permits the section 2-103(I) (b) definition to apply to Article
9 transactions). Bus see Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis.2d 16, 19.20, 165 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1969)
(Section 1-201(19) honesty in fact standard applies only for consumers and § 2-103(1) (b) must
always apply as between merchants because of its specificity).
' 32 U.C.C. § 1-201(32). U.C.C. § 1-201(33) states that "'Purchaser' means a person who
takes by purchase."
'" See United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974)
(unclear whether or not secured party has interest in after-acquired property, but court allows
status of good faith purchaser to defeat unpaid seller under § 2-702(3) ); In re Daley, 17
U.C.C. REP. 433, 435 (D. Mass. 1975) (on a fact situation almost identical to Samuels, secured
party holding after-acquired property interest held to defeat unpaid credit seller under §
2-702(3) because secured party is good faith purchaser): In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C.
REP. 1107, 1111-12 (D. Mass. 1967) (secured party with after-acquired property interest qual-
ifies as purchaser for value to defeat credit seller under § 2-702(3) ); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v.
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354 (1974) (bank took security interest
in auto dealer's inventory and advanced cash to pay wholesale dealer, thereby becoming a
purchaser for value under §§ 1-201(32), (33), (44) ); Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236
N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975) (credit company took security interest in auto dealer's inventory and
advanced cash to pay wholesale dealer, thereby becoming a purchaser for value under §§
1-201(32),(33),(44) ); Jordan v. Butler, 182 Neb. 626, 156 N.W.2d 778 (1968) (unclear whether
secured party took after-acquired property interest or not, court found that the "transaction
reeks of fraud" in respect of the seller and intermediaries and held the secured party a pur-
chaser, permitting him to prevail against sellers under § 2-702(3) ); First Citizen's Bank &
Trust v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850 (1971) (holder of per-
fected security interest in after-acquired property qualifies as purchaser to defeat credit seller's
bid for reclamation under § 2-702(3) ); Stumbo v. Hult, 86 Ore. 132, 444 P.2d 564 (1968) (dic-
tum) (Holder of after-acquired property security interest is purchaser because of §§
1-201(32),(33),(44) ). But see In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. 436 (N.D.
Ga. 1974) (court concedes that § 1-201(33) may be broad enough to include the holder of an
after-acquired security interest in the definition of a purchaser, but refuses to designate such a
secured party as a good faith purchaser within the meaning of § 2-702(3) and finds that the
secured party acquired no rights in the collateral at least for the 10 day period provided for in
§ 2-702).
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As a secured party whose agreement with Samuels & Co. gave it a se-
curity interest in the debtor's after acquired property' 34 C.I.T. appears to
be -a "purchaser." However, it is not clear that a security interest which au-
tomatically attaches to after acquired property the moment the debtor ac-
quires rights in that property is a "voluntary transaction creating an interest
in property."'" It has been suggested that, under a correct reading of sec-
tion 2-403(1), a secured party who relies solely on an after acquired prop-
erty clause to defeat a seller's right•of reclamation is not a purchaser since
its interest is not created voluntarily.'" On this rationale, C.I.T., whose in-
terest in the cattle was created by the automatic operation of the after ac-
quired property clause, was not a purchaser.'"
d. C.I.T. as a "Purchaser for Value"
If C.I.T. is a Code purchaser, the question remains whether it is a
purchaser for value. The Code definition of "value" includes the following:
"a person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them ... (b) as security for
or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim."' 38
The general view among the few courts which have dealt with the
question of value in this context is that a secured party whose security
agreement with the buyer predates the seller's reclamation right has given
"value" for its security interest in the debtor's after acquired property.'"
194 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at '20.
1" U.C.C. 1-201(32) (emphasis added).
"6 This view is attributed to Justice Robert Braucher, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court; Chairman, Subcommittee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Conimer-
cial Code to consider Article Two; Reporter for the Article 9 Review Committee of the Per-
manent Editorial Board. Justice Braucher's view is outlined in a footnote in Countryman,
Buyers v. Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, I N.M. L. REV. 435, 458-59, n.119 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Countryman].
"7 Note the court's treatment of a secured party relying solely on an after-acquired
property clause in In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. - RE•, 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
There the court said;
a construction of § '2-702(3) and 2-403 favoring [the secured creditor as against
the reclaiming seller] would violate the policy of ... 1-106(1) which requires
that [reclaiming seller's] reclamation remedies under ... § 2-702(2) should place
it in as good a position as if [buyer] had performed. § 2-702(3) was never de-
signed to protect Article 9 secured creditors, only Article 2 "purchasers," though ,
the court is aware that the definition of purchaser is broad enough to include an
Article 9 secured creditor.
Id. at 441.
For the majority view, see Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. REP, 1107 (D. Mass. 1967);
W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.G.G. 304 (1964); Hogan, The Marriage of
Sales to Chattel Security in the U.C.C.: Mass. Variety, 38 B.U. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as Hogan]; Note, Selected Priority Problems in Secured Financing under the U.C.C., 68
YALE L.J. 751, 758 (1959).
"" U.C.C.	 1-201(44).
"5 The court in In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967) stated
that "Textile's [secured party relying on after-acquired property clause] pre-existing claim con-
stitutes value." Id. at 1111. However, the court also noted that
Textile's pre-existing claim is not the only consideration for its 'purchase' of the
goods in issue. Textile made a further advance of $25,000.00 to [Bankrupt] on
December 7, 1965, which was roughly contemporaneous with the dates on which
the [unpaid sellers] delivered the goods to Hayward (December 2, 3, 6, 7 and 9,
1965).
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The rationale is that the secured party acquired its rights "as security for or
in partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim." Hence, the secured party
would have given "value" as defined by the Code. However, there is a
minority view which suggests that a secured party must show it made an
additional advance in reliance on the buyer's possession of the goods in
order to be a section 2-403 good faith purchaser for value.'"
C.I.T.'s security interest in the after acquired cattle was taken as secu-
rity for or in partial satisfaction of its pre-existing claims against Samuels
based on the regular weekly advances it already had extended. On May 23,
1969, when C.1.T. refused to make its weekly advance, Samuels & Co.
owed C.I.T. more than $1,800,000."' Under the prevalent interpretation
of a pre-existing debt as "value," C.I.T. gave value.
According to the minority view, however, C.1.T. did not give value for
its rights to the cattle. The cattle was purchased between May 12 and May
23, I969." 2
 On May 23, C.I.T. refused to make its regular weekly advance
"and began taking steps to liquidate its outstanding loans to Samuels."'"
Consequently, C.I.T. made no advance in reliance on Samuels & Co.'s pos-
session of the cattle and did not give value.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SIX OPINIONS
Having examined the complexities of the applicable law, it is tempting
to sympathize with all the courts who tried to find a path through the legal
maze presented by the Samuels case. Some of the opinions clearly were
dominated by a concern for an equitable balancing of the economic re-
alities, and this concern led to faulty legal analysis.' 44 The final en bane
opinion of the Fifth Circuit, concurred in by nine members of the fifteen
judge panel, was a literal, narrow reading of the Code producing a result
which overlooked both the underlying policies of the Code and the eco-
nomic constraints of the meat industry.' 45 The six opinions 145 will now be
examined to discover whether a solution might have been reached which
would not have distorted the language of the Code, yet would have given
recognition to the economic realities and practical constraints of the meat
industry.
Id. Thus, the advance of December 7 seems to have dearly been in consideration of the secu-
rity interest in the goods and not in consideration of the pre-existing claim (after-acquired
property clause). This case nonetheless has been widely cited for the proposition that a se-
cured creditor can be a good faith purchaser for value as that term is used in § 2-403(1) on
the strength of an after-acquired property clause alone. See, e.g., United States v. Wyoming
Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Daley, 17 U.C.C. REP. 433 (D. Mass. 1975);
Stumbo v. Hult, 86 Ore. 132, 444 P.2d 564 (1968); First Citizen's Bank & Trust Co. v.
Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179 S.E.2d 850 (1971). But see In re American
Food Purveyors. Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (Hayward Woolen criticized).
' 4° Countryman, supra note 136, at 458-59.
141
 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 11.
142 1d.
143 Id.
144 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 20-29; 483 F.2d 557 (1973), 510 F.2d 139 (1975)
(dissent); 526 F.2d 1238 (1976).
146
 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976).
"6 See note 9 supra.
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A. Opinion I: In the Matter of Samuels & Co., Inc., No. BK 3-1314 (W.D.
Texas September 29, 1971): Decision for Cattle Sellers.
On May 21, 1970, fifteen unpaid cattle sellers filed suit. On Septem-
ber 29, 1971 the referee in bankruptcy, Elmore Whitehurst, ordered the
trustee in bankruptcy of Samuels & Co. to pay the cattle sellers the pur-
chase price of their cattle. 14 ' Referee Whitehurst's findings of fact were
later adopted by the federal district court judge' " and became the basis for
four subsequent opinions.
In addition to the facts outlined earlier in this article, the referee
made the following findings: The cattle sellers had "considered" their sales
to be cash sales and had intended that title to their cattle not pass until
payment had been received.' 49 He also found that "grade and yield" sales
by cattle sellers are a recognized custom and usage in the trade, 15° and that
until the livestock is graded and the yield determined, sellers can identify
their particular livestock. However, after the livestock is graded and the
yield determined and the meat processed, packaged and sold, the referee
stated that it becomes "impossible to trace or identify a particular seller's
livestock."' 5 ' The referee further found that although there was no way to
determine what actual disposition was made by the bankrupt, receiver or
trustee of the meat from these particular animals "at least some of the car-
casses of plaintiff' sellers' cattle were on hand in Samuels' plant at the time
the petition under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act was filed" on May
23, 1969. 15 ' Referee Whitehurst also found that "C.I.T. knew or should
have known of the manner by which the bankrupt bought livestock from
the plaintiffs on a grade and yield basis"' 53 and finally that Samuels & Co.
was subject to the regulations of the PSA.' 54
Having made these findings of fact, the referee articulated his conclu-
sions of law.'" First, he concluded that the sales of cattle were cash sales
and not credit sales. The referee stated that the cash sales were made pur-
suant to a method sanctioned by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture, and that it would be difficult to conceive how under the circumstances
the sellers could have followed a different method of making sales for cash.
To consider the transaction a credit sale, the referee reasoned, would have
been contrary to the intent of the parties and would have made the cattle
sellers involuntary unsecured creditors of the bankrupt subordinate to the
secured claims of C.I.T. 156
In addition to concluding that the cattle were sold for cash, the referee
'" Record Appendix, suprrz note 30, at 9-10.
"s /d. at 31.
'" Id. at 25.
155 Id. at 23.
'" Id. at 24.
I52 Id. at 25.
"3 1(1, at 26.
'" Id. at 23.
165 The referee cited neither cases nor statutes (except the PSA). He used some of the
terminology of the Code to describe the conflicting claims, e.g., the "perfected security in-
terest" of C.I.T., id. at 20, "the security interest of C.I.T.... did not attach." id, at 27.
'"° Id. at 28.
123
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ruled that title and ownership of the livestock did not pass from the sellers
to Samuels & Co. until payment had been made to the sellers. Accordingly,
the referee determined that the security interest of C.I.T. "could not and
did not attach to the livestock in question."'" Since C.I.T.'s security interest
in Samuels' after acquired property had not attached to the particular cat-
tle, C.I.T. did not have an enforceable security interest in that cattle. The
referee further concluded that the cattle sellers were entitled to the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the cattle. He ruled that the cattle sellers did not have
the burden of tracing the proceeds of the livestock after it had been con-
verted to meat by the bankrupt and comingled with meat received from
other sources in the course of its packing business. Since the particular sale
of cattle occurred on the eve of bankruptcy, the referee ruled, it was in-
cumbent on C.I.T. to show that the trustee of Samuels did not receive "a
substantial part" of the proceeds of the sale of the cattle. In light of these
conclusions, the referee found that the equities were with the cattle sellers
and he ruled in their favor.' 59
The referee was no doubt accurate in finding that these sellers in-
tended to make cash sales and intended that title would pass to Samuels &
Co. only when the sellers received payment. This conclusion reflects eco-
nomic reality. Unlike credit sellers, these cattle sellers were not relying for
payment on the ongoing success of Samuels & Co. and its continued sales
of meat to buyers in the food chain. 159 Instead, the cattle sellers were rely-
ing on Samuels' present solvency when they took checks which they as-
sumed would be honored.
The referee's opinion reflects an understandable concern for the
plight of the sellers. His view of the cash sale doctrine, while a valid in-
terpretation of pre-Code law,' 9° however, is not a proper interpretation of
the Code. The Code does not permit a seller to reserve title after delivery
of the goods. Sections 1-201(37) and 2-401 expressly preclude a seller from
retaining title after delivery of goods to the buyer. 1 e'
As a long-term financer of various businesses throughout the country,
C.I.T. was seriously threatened by the referee's conclusion which sub-
ordinated a perfected secured creditor, claiming by virtue of an after ac-
quired property clause, to an unpaid cash seller claiming the proceeds of
unpaid for goods.'" Responding to this serious threat, C.I.T. appealed the
decision of the bankruptcy referee to the federal district court.
'" id. at 27.
' 5" Id. at 28-29. Pursuant to orders of the court, the receiver and trustee had paid the
funds received from collections of accounts receivable and from sale of meat to C.I.T. to be
held by C.I.T. subject to the rights of other parties to prove superior claims. Accordingly, the
referee was ordering C.I.T. to pay the cattle sellers out of these Funds.
"9 See Note, The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A Critique of 2-403 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1205, 1220 (1963).
'BD See text at note 100 supra.
'"	 § 2-401(1) provides in part; "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the
title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest." Section 1-201(37) defining a security interest contains this same sen-
tence with a cross reference to 2-401. Article 2's restatement of contracting parties' rights
and remedies in terms of the realities of the transactions concerned rather than in terms of
"title" is generally regarded as Article 2's most important innovation. See Peters, supra note
101, at 201.
162 Record Appendix, supra note 30. at 28-29.
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B. Opinion 2: In the Matter of Samuels & Co., Inc., No. BK 3-1314 (N.D.
Texas November, 24, 1972): Decision for C.I.T.
District Judge Hughes adopted the referee's findings of fact, but re-
versed his conclusions of law and found for C.I.T.'" The principal points
of Judge Hughes' decision eventually became the theory of the final opin-
ion in the case, the en banc opinion .of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, four decisions and four years later.
Judge Hughes ruled that the sellers' interests in the cattle were res-
ervations of title under section 2-401 and were therefore Article 2 security
interests under section 1-201(37) and 2-401(1). Since the cattle sellers had
not perfected their security interests according to the requirements of sec-,
tion 9-312, she ruled that the sellers' interests in the unpaid for cattle were
therefore subordinate to C.I.T.'s perfected security interest. 164 .She stated,
that under section 2-403(1), the "[cattle] sellers, by making delivery of the
livestock to the bankrupt without perfecting a security interest therein ...
[enabled Samuels & Co. to] ... transfer good title to a good faith purchaser
for value including C.I.T. and the Trustee ...." 1 " Thus, the court con-
cluded that even a timely demand for reclamation under sections 2-702(2)
and (3), which plaintiffs had not made, would not have affected C.I.T.'s
title to the cattle.'" Accordingly, C.I.T.'s perfected security interest pre-
vailed over the cattle sellers' unperfected interest in the cattle.
The district court's decision was a short statement of the applicable
rules under the Code. The unique portion of her opinion was her assump-
tion that the sale to Samuels & Co. was a credit sale. This assumption con-
tradicted the referee's finding of fact"' as well as the later rulings of the
circuit judges in their majority and dissenting opinions.'" There can be no
quarrel with the court's statement of the main issues raised by this case
under Articles 2 and 9 of the Code, only with their resolution. Because the
court's principal conclusions accorded with the final en banc opinion of the
Fifth Circuit, they will be discussed together with that opinion.
Since the district court's decision raised extremely complex questions
under the Code, the resolution of which would affect the business decisions
of the cattle sellers, the sellers appealed.
' 63 Id. at 31-33.
" 4 judge Hughes did not mention 9-113, the provision which, in effect, subjects "a
security interest arising solely under . . . (Article Two)" (emphasis added) to Ankle Nine only
when the debtor (Samuels) "lawfully obtainis] possession of the goods." See text at notes
269-93 infra. -
16s Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 31. But see § 9-301(3) defining trustee as lien
creditor.
"1 " Id. at 31-32. the district court in this unexplained conclusion was classifying the sale
to Samuels & Co. as a credit sale. The court also based its decision on its belief that C.I.T.
would prevail under § 2-326 and that plaintiff cattle sellers failed to establish their right to re-
claim under the Bankruptcy Act because they did not positively identify the property either in
its original or substituted form and did not establish that either C.1.T. or the trustee received
"any such property or the proceeds therefrom." Id. at 23.
" 7 Id. at 25.
"' 510 F.2d at 146; 526 F.2d at 1241, 1251. The first decision at 483 F.2d 557 does not
deal with this issue. Circuit Judge Gee in a concurring opinion said "the delayed pricing ar-
rangement transformed the 'cash sale' into a credit transaction for all commercial purposes
regardless of how the two parties characterized it." 526 F.2d at 1249.
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C. Opinion 3: Samuels & Co. v. Mahon, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973): First
Panel Decision for Cattle Sellers.
In the first decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided
panel reversed Judge Hughes and remanded the case for reinstatement of
the referee's judgment in favor of the cattle sellers. The court ruled that
the regulations promulgated under the PSA, and not the Code, determine
the priority of the conflicting claims of C.I.T. and the cattle sellers.
The majority of the three judge panel' 69 stated the issue as follows:
Is the reserved purchase money security interest provision ...
[section 9-107(1) of the Code] applicable to what would otherwise
have given Samuels voidable title under ... (section 2-403) of the
Code, or do the regulations promulgated under the Packers and
Stockyards Act ... comprise a course of dealing and usage of the
trade so as to modify the Code provisions .and permit the res-
ervation of title to have effect against C.I.T.'s lien without per-
fection by filing under the Code § 9-301? 17 °
In reaching its decision, the court pointed out that the course of deal-
ing and trade usage mandated by the PSA reserved to the cattle sellers a
special kind of 'interest in the cattle sold which is "more than an un-
perfected security interest subject to reclamation.""' In addition, the court
noted, the PSA regulations provide that once a check has issued from a
packer, the carcass will be processed and its identity will be lost. Con-
sequently, the cash seller loses the right to reclaim the goods. 172 The court
concluded that:
The [PSA] regulations and cases,•therefore, consider the packer's
obligation to be that of a fiduciary . . and the purpose of the act to
be the protection of the producer's and consumer's purse. Where
the packer defaults by the issuance of a bad check (and destroys
the identity of the security by processing the carcasses into fun-
gible meat products) the seller is the beneficiary of a trust imposed
by the remedial statute. 13
Thus, the court read the PSA as creating a trust for the benefit of the cat-
tle sellers to enable the sellers to enforce their right to reclaim the cattle.
The majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit was attacked in a vigorous
dissent by Judge Godbold. Judge Godbold asserted that neither the scope
of the PSA nor its regulations requiring prompt payment supplanted "what
might be called the commercial law of the states." 14 Thus, he accused the
majority of ignoring the Code in order to produce what the majority con-
sidered a just result.
The Fifth Circuit shared the referee's concern for the unpaid cattle
sellers. While Referee Whitehurst escaped the Code by pretending it did
'a' Circuit Judges Ingraham and Ainsworth. Judge Godbold dissented.
'" 483 F.2d at 560.
'" Id, at 563.
'" See text at note 71 supra. See Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 24.
'" 483 F.2d at 563 (emphasis added).
1 " Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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not exist, the circuit judges avoided the district court's interpretation of Ar-
ticles 2 and 9 by referring to a federal statute, the PSA.
In effect, the ruling of the Fifth Circuit forced the long term secured
creditor of the meat packer, C.I.T., rather than the unpaid cash seller of
the cattle, to bear the risk of the packer's non-payment for cattle inventory.
It. seemed unjust to the court, as it had to the referee,'" that the secured
financer should be repaid by monies derived from goods whose sellers had
remained unpaid.
C.I.T. was not yet ready to give up. 176 It petitioned for rehearing and
then for rehearing en banc.'" Both petitions were denied and C.1.T.
applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.'"
D. Opinion 4: Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974): Decision Reversed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,'" reversed the Fifth Circuit's
decison and remanded the case for disposition under the Texas Business
and Commercial Code (U.C.C.)."" The Court stated that it found "no evi-
dence in either the [PSA] or the regulations that packers are to hold cattle
or carcasses in trust until the sellers actually convert into cash the checks
given them as payment for each sale."'" The Court noted that the PSA
regulations explicitly impose trust relationships in some situations by re-
quiring custodial accounts. The absence of a provision requiring packers to
establish trust accounts on behalf of sellers until payment was actually re-
ceived the Court reasoned, suggests that the Secretary of Agriculture ex-
pected "that cattle sellers, making sales to packers in the ordinary course of
business, would assume the normal risks of insolvency which any seller as-
sumes."'" The Court asserted that:
[PSA] and Regulations 201.42 and 201.99 comprise a course of
122 Sec text at note 158 supra.
"" By this stage in the proceedings CIT. must have incurred legal fees close to, or
more than, the $55,000 at issue here; the finance company was represented at the three pro-
ceedings by a large Dallas law firm. See vol. V. Martindale Hubbell Law Directory, 951B-52B
(199th ed. 1977). The firm filed extensive briefs on their behalf. Because of the nature of
C.I.T.'s financing operations, however, the issue of the priority of C.I.T.'s security interest in
its debtor's after acquired property over an unpaid seller's right to reclaim the goods or their
proceeds was critical to cur. Many of C.1.T.'s loans were used by the debtors as the major
sources of financing for their operations. In part, C.1.T.'s security for those loans was the
after acquired property of the debtor whose sellers were unpaid at the time of the debtor-
buyer's bankruptcy. As in the case of the American Beef Packer Bankruptcy, see note 3 supra,
the amounts owed to unpaid sellers can be enormous. It was therefore to C.1.T's advantage to
litigate this vital question in an underfinanced case involving $55,000 owed to fifteen cattle
sellers, instead of litigating the issue when it arose in the context of it $22,000,000 loss to cattle
sellers from thirteen states.
'" 483 F.2d 557.
' 78 1d.
I " 416 U.S. 100, 114 (1974).
' 5" The Supreme Court did not designate a "winner" in its opinion.
1 " 416 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1974) (emphasis added). The recent amendment to the PSA
remedied this omission by explicitly requiring that packers establish trust accounts for the
monies received from the sale or meat and meat products until the sellers arc paid. Payment
in the case of check is defined as payment by the bank on which the cheek is drawn. See note
238 infra.
"2 Id. at 112.
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dealing and usage of the trade known to both the bankrupt
packer and C.I.T. which had financed it for an extended period.
.White we hold that the Act and regulations do not ex proprio vig-
ore override the provisions of Texas law determining priorities,
we do not mean to say that a course of conduct mandated by the
Act or regulations might not, just as any other course of conduct,
be relevant or even dispositive under the state Iaw. 183
The Court then remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit with directions to
apply the Code.'"
	 -
The Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the PSA or the regulations
themselves established a fiduciary relationship which would override the
Code or establish a special priority in bankruptcy for the cattle sellers. 185
However, the Court went to some length to suggest to the Fifth Circuit that
it could be found on remand that the course of conduct between the cattle
sellers and Samuels & Co., which was mandated by the federal regulations,
gave the cattle sellers priority under the Code. The case returned to the
Fifth Circuit on remand.
E. Opinion 5: Samuels & Co., Inc. v. Mahon, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975):
Second Panel Decision for Cattle Sellers.
In its first decision the Fifth Circuit panel seemed to concede that
C.I.T. would prevail under the Code' 86 and used the PSA as a vehicle for
avoiding this result. Having been told by the United States Supreme Court
that the Code and not the PSA was controlling, the same panel was forced
to analyze the relevant issues in the context of the Code. However, the
Fifth Circuit did not follow the course suggested by the Supreme Court.
Instead it based its second decision—again for the cattle sellers—on a
strained reading of Articles 2 and 9. 187
Referring to sections 2-507 and 2-511 of the Code, the court ruled
that the sale by plaintiff cattle sellers to Samuels & Co. was a - cash sale
which gave the cattle sellers a right to reclaim as against Samuels & Co.'"
In analyzing sections 2-507 and 2-511, the court suggested that:
the underlying philosophy of the common law cash sale doctrine
has been embodied here ... the existence of a valid contractual
relationship between the buyer and seller is dependent upon the
buyer's completing his part of the bargain and paying for the
merchandise. When the buyer fails to pay he no longer has even
the right to possess the goods.'"
The court then stated that the sellers' failure to assert their right to
reclaim within ten days did not bar their action for three reasons. First, the
183 1d. at 113-14.
104 Id,
lea Id. at 107.
' B 6 483 F.2d at 559, 560.
"T 510 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1975). Circuit Judges Ainsworth and Ingraham again consti-
tuted the majority and Judge Ingraham again wrote the opinion.
"8 /d. at 144-48.
"° Id. at 196.
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underlying purpose of the ten day limitation—the early identification of
claims and the preservation of all creditors' rights in order to assure equit-
able .distribution of the bankrupt's estate—had been achieved in this case
with the appointment of the trustee.'" Second, "the facts show that the cat-
tle sellers had made a good faith attempt to comply with ... the Code" 1 "
in that the cattle sellers had "apparently"" 2 believed that Samuels con-
tinued to conduct normal operations after filing the Chapter XI petition
and that accordingly "there was no need for them to assert their rights
under the Code until after the adjudication of straight bankruptcy."'" Fi-
nally, since most of the cattle had been destroyed by the time the petition
in bankruptcy had been filed,'" it would have been "an exercise in futility"
for the cattle sellers to assert their right to reclaim.'" In light of these con-
siderations, the court concluded that "strict application of a ten day limita-
tion on the right to reclaim would be unwarranted."'"
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the unpaid cattle sellers' right to re-
claim was superior to C.I.T.'s unattached security interest.'" In the court's
view the cattle sellers' interest was not a reservation of title which would be-
come an unperfected security interest under sections 2-401(1) and 9-113,
because section 2-401 does not apply to cash sales. This conclusion was
supported by the explicit provisions of section 9-102 and the comments
thereto, which limit the application of Article 9 to transactions intended to
create security interests. 199
In the alternative, the court concluded that even if the cattle sellers
had an unperfected security interest, C.1.T.'s perfected security interest still
would not prevail. The court reached this result by determining that even
if' Samuels' possession of the cattle and its right to begin slaughtering the
cattle and packaging the meat gave it "rights in the collateral" so that
C.I.T.'s security interest in after acquired property attached to that cat-
tle,'"" these rights were only conditional. Upon its failure to make payment
under the contract, Samuels had no right to retain or dispose of the prop-
erty. Since Samuels' "defeasible interest in the property ... terminated
when it failed to pay," the court ruled that "[C.1.T.'s] right, derived solely
from the rights of the debtor [Samuels], also terminated. 2°0
Id. at 147. The court noted that 	 had filed a petition for reclamation within
two months of Samuels' Chapter X1 petition which had resulted in a hearing and order by the
referee. This hearing "apparently" involved "extensive disclosure of Samuels' financial affairs,"
and the referee's order expressly reserved for further consideration "any question pertaining
to conflicting claims of liens or lien priorities," The referee's order on C.1.T.'s reclamation pe-
tition was included in the Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 41-45.
' 1" 510 F.2d at 148. These facts do not appear in the referee's findings of fact. Record
Appendix, supra note 30, at 20-27. These conclusions were apparently based on the cattle sell-
ers' brief. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Stowers v. Mahon, 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973).
102 id.
"3 Id.
194 The referee found that "at least sonic of the carcasses were on hand in the
bankrupt's plant at the time the , .. Chapter X1 petition was filed." Record Appendix, supra
note 30, at 24-25.
' 95 510 F.2d at 148.
'" Id.
'" Id. at 148-51.
"8 Id. at 148-49.
19° U.C.C. 9-204(1). See text at notes 84.86 supra.
2" 510 F.2d at 150.
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After concluding that the cattle sellers as cash sellers had a right to
reclaim which was superior to C.I.T.'s security interest, the circuit court de-
cided that C.I.T. was not a good faith purchaser for value whose interest
would have priority over the sellers' right to reclaim."' The court noted
that the Code definition of "purchase" includes "any ... voluntary transac-
tion creating an interest in property."'" Since Samuels had no rights in the
cattle as a consequence of its failure to make payment, C.I.T. had no rights
in the cattle. Lacking rights in the cattle, C.1.T. had no "interest" in that
property and could not be a "purchaser" under section 2-403(1). 3 °3
The court also determined that C.I.T. lacked good faith. The court
stated that "implicit in the term good faith is the requirement that C.I.T.
take its interest in the cattle without notice of the outstanding claims of
others.' ,204 However, C.I.T. had notice of the cattle sellers' outstanding
claims due to its familiarity with Samuels & Co.'s operations. Thus, the
court concluded that C.I.T. was neither a purchaser nor in good faith, and
could not prevail over the cattle sellers by virture of section 2-403(1). 205
The court closed its opinion with a general appeal to the "equitable
principles ... [which) ... govern the exercise of Bankruptcy jurisdiction,"
stating that:
We do not believe that the drafters of the Code intended for the
unpaid sellers to walk away from this transaction with nothing,
neither their goods nor the purchase price, while the mortgagee
enjoys a preferred lien on that for which it refused to advance
payment. Based on our understanding of the Code, such a result
is unsupportable. 200
Judge Godbold again dissented. In his own words, he reached his
conclusion
not as a product of revealed truth, but rather of a meticulous
and dispassionate reading of Articles Two and Nine and an un-
derstanding of the Code as an integrated statute whose Articles
and Sections overlap and flow into one another in an effort to
encourage specific types of commercial behavior. The Code's
overall plan, which typically favors good faith purchasers, and
which encourages notice filing of nonpossessory security interests
in personalty through the imposition of stringent penalties for
nonfiling, compels a finding that the perfected secured party
here should prevail.
My brothers have not concealed that their orientation in the
case before us is to somehow reach a result in favor of the sellers
of cattle, assumed by them to be "little fellows," and against a
"'Id. at 151-53.
202	C.C. § 1-201(32). See text at note 132 supra.
2" 510 14. .2d at 153.
204
 The court cited only § 1-201(19) and "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned" and did not mention § 2-103(1)(b) applying to merchants, "the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
202 !d. at 152. The court mentioned but did not discuss the requireinent of § 2-403(1)
that G.I.T. be a good faith purchaser for value.
2" Id. at 153.
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large corporate lender, because it seems the "fair" thing to do.
We do not sit as federal chancellors confecting ways to escape
the state law of commercial transactions when that law produces
a result not to our tastes. Doing what seems fair is heady stuff.
But the next seller may be a tremendous corporate conglomerate
engaged in the cattle feeding business, and the next lender a
small town Texas bank. Today's heady draught may give the
majority a euphoric feeling, but it can produce tomorrow's hang-
over. 207
C.I.T. petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en bane which was
granted.
F. Opinion 6: Samuels & Co., Inc. v. Mahon, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1976): En Banc Decision for C.I. T.
On February 17, 1976, six decisions after the petition was filed and
almost six years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc re-
versed its previous majority opinion (hereinafter "panel decision"), 2 " af-
firmed. the district court opinion, 209 adopted Judge Godbold's second dis-
senting opinion as the majority opinion en bane and found for C.I.T.
In the en banc opinion, written by Judge Godbold, the court reached
four major conclusions. First, C.I.T. was a good faith purchaser for value
entitled to prevail over sellers under section 2-403(1). The court reached
this conclusion . by first stating that the Code's definition of "purchaser" as
one who takes "by . ... any ... voluntary transaction creating an interest in
property" was broad enough to include an Article 9 secured party such as
C.I.T. 2 " Since purchasers can take from defaulting cash buyers under sec-
tion 2-403(1), the court determined that a defaulting cash buyer must, by
definition, have sufficient rights in the property, "however marginal" 2 " to
allow attachment of the security interest. If this were not the intent of the
Code, section 2-403(1)(b) would be meaningless since that subsection pro-
vides expressly that a good faith purchaser for value can acquire good title
from a buyer who had paid for the goods with a bad check. Therefore, the
court concluded, Samuels had "rights in the collateral" upon its receipt of
the cattle and C.I.T.'s security interest attached at that time. 212
"7 ld. at 154. Judge Godbold's view of the majority decision was generally shared by
commentators. See Note, The Right of an Unpaid Cash Seller to Reclaim Goods is Superior to the
Floating Lien of an Inventory Financer, 9 CREIGHTON L.R. 412, 417 (1975); Note, Seller's Right to
Reclaim Has Priority Over a Perfected Security Interest, 7 Si'. MARY'S L.J. 462, 466 (1975). But see
Dugan, Cash Sale Sellers Under Articles 2 and 9 of the U.C.C., S U.C.C.L.J. 330 (1976). For com-
ments on the first panel decision see Note, Priority of Liens in Secured Transactions — Packers of
Stockyards Act Alters U.C.C., 42 FORDHAM L. Rev. 716 (1974); Note, Federal Regulations of Meat-
packers Supercede the Priority in Bankruptcy of a Perfected Security Interest Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 52 Tex. L. REV. 570 (1974).
205 In order to avoid confusion, the second majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit panel
at 510 F.2d 139 will be referred to as "the panel decision" and the majority as "the panel."
200 The en banc opinion also affirmed and explicated the principal bases of the district
court's original decision relying on Articles 2 and 9 of the Code. See text at notes 163-66.
21° 526 F.2d at 1242.
2" Id. at 1243.
2 ' 2 /d.
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Once C.I.T.'s security interest properly attached, the court de-
termined, it did not terminate upon Samuels' nonpayment. The "whole
point of Article Nine is the continuity of perfected security interests once
they have properly attached, despite subsequent loss of control or possession of
the collateral by the debtor. § 9-201." 2 " The court recognized that, as
against the sellers, Samuels' failure to pay deprived it of the right to retain
or dispose of the goods. However, the court also noted that the Code ex-
pressly gives a seller in a cash sale the power to transfer good title to a
good faith purchaser for value when goods have been delivered even
though the goods were paid for by a check later dishonored. 214 Thus,
C.I.T. was a purchaser.
The court then decided that C.I.T. had acted in good faith. The court
stated that, rather than requiring lack of knowledge of third party claims as
an element of good faith, the Code, under Articles 1 and 2, requires only
honesty in fact, reasonable commercial behavior and fair dealing. "The
Code's good faith provision requires 'honesty in fact, it hardly requires
a secured party to continue financing a doomed enterprise." 2 ' 5
The Fifth Circuit opinion did not discuss "value" in the context of
C.I.T.'s qualifications as a good faith purchaser for value under section
2-403. However, in ruling that C.I.T. had a "perfect[ed] Article Nine secu-
rity interest which extend[ed] to the goods claimed by the seller[s]," 215 the
court ruled that Samuels' preexisting indebtedness of $1.8 million consti-
tuted value for the purposes of the attachment of C.I.T.'s security in-
terest.217
 Thus, the court concluded that C.I.T. was a good faith purchaser
for value under section 2-403.
As its second major conclusion, the court ruled that the unpaid cattle
sellers' interest was an unperfected security interest under sections 2-401(1)
and 9-113. The panel had ruled that section 2-401(1) does not apply to
cash sales and therefore that the cattle sellers retained an interest greater
than a security interest. Characterizing this as a "restrictive interpretation"
of section 2-401(1), without justification in the policies of the section or the
language of the Code, the court noted that many courts have applied sec-
tion 2-401(1) to cash sales. 2 " The Fifth Circuit also expressly rejected the
panel's view that Article 9 governs only consensual security interests and
that no such interest was intended here: "While it is true that many in-
terests governed by Article Nine are consensual, ... the Code clearly sub-
jects Article Two security interests arising not by consent but by operation
of law to Article Nine."212 Accordingly, the sellers' interest in the cattle was
subject to Article 9. Since . the sellers did not satisfy Article 9's filing and
notification requirements, the court concluded that the cattle sellers had an
unperfected security interest.
The third major conclusion was that C.I.T., as the holder of a per-
fected Article 9 security interest in the collateral claimed by the sellers,
would prevail over the sellers' unperfected security interest under Article 9.
2 ' 2 /d. at 1247 (emphasis in original).
2 ' 4 /d.
215 id. at 1243-44, citing U.C.C.
	
1-201(19).
2" 526 F.2d at 1242.
S 17 Id.
" 8 1d. at 1246.
2" Id. at 1247, citing U.C.C. § 9-102 & Comment.
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Since the three requirements for attachment under section 9-204(1),
agreement, value, and rights in the collateral, were satisfied, C.1.T.'s secu-
rity interest attached to the cattle. In the court's opinion, the security in-
terest in Samuels' after acquired inventory was authorized by the 1963 se-
curity agreement which remained in effect. C.I.T.'s preexisting debt consti-
tuted "value," and upon delivery of the cattle Samuels acquired sufficient
"rights in the collateral.' 220
The court observed that the sellers never perfected their purchase
money security interest under section 9-312, which would have given them
priority over C.I.T. Under Article 9's priority rules, an unperfected secu-
rity interest is subordinate to a perfected security interest. Therefore, the
court necessarily concluded that the sellers' interest was subordinated to
C.I.T.'s interest and that "in this case [the sellers] lose the whole of their in-
terests.„221
The court's final conclusion was that the sellers' right to reclaim is
subject to the rights of good faith purchasers for value and was waived by
the cattle sellers' failure to reclaim within ten days. The court called the
cash seller's right to reclaim a "judicially-confected right" 222 which is never
good as against third parties who are good faith purchasers from the
buyer. This right is strictly limited by "the Code's absolute requirement in
Section 2-507, Comment 3, invariably adhered to by the courts, that de-
mand for return be made within 10 days after receipt or else be lost." 223 In
addition, the right to reclaim in either cash or credit sales does not extend
to the proceeds of the goods. Whenever the Code recognizes an interest in
proceeds "it does so expressly. "224
A new petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was denied on Oc-
tober 4, 1976. 225 Judge Godbold's en bane opinion is therefore the final law
of the Samuels. case. It was, as he stated himself, "a meticulous reading of
Articles Two and Nine."226 It was indeed meticulous, but misguided.
IV. ECONOMIC REALITY, PIECEMEAL SOLUTIONS AND THE CODE
A. Economic and Legislative Context
Thus endeth the long, unhappy saga of the fifteen cattle sellers,
Samuels & Co., and C.I.T. The conclusion is undesirable for a number of
reasons. From an economic perspective, the rule of Samuels is undesirable
because it increases transaction costs in the meat industry, and because it
inefficiently allocates the burden of the risk of meat packer losses.
Under the Samuels decision, in order to prevail over prior perfected
non-purchase money security interests cattle sellers have to comply with the
2" 526 F.2d at 1242-43. The court did not discuss the additional requirements for per-
fection and enforceability of a security interest, viz., filing and the existence of a security
agreement.
1” Id. at 1248, citing U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301, 9-312(5).
222 526 F.2d at 1244,
"3 1d. at 1244-45.
2 " Id. at 1245.
223 429 U.S. 834(1976).
223 526 F.2d at 1241.
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filing and notification requirements of section 9-312(3) of the Code. This
section provides:
A purchase money security interest in inventory collateral
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collat-
eral if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor receives possession of the collateral; and
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the
holder of the purchase money security interest or who, prior to
the date of the filing made by the holder of the purchase money
security interest, had filed a financing statement covering the
same items or type of inventory, has received notification of the
purchase money security interest before the debtor receives pos-
session of the collateral covered by the purchase money security
interest; and
(c) such notification states that the person giving the notice has
or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in in-
ventory of the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
To have perfected its security interest under section 9-312(3), therefore,
each cattle seller would have had to give the required notice to all prior
holders of conflicting security interests in the buyer's property before the
seller, delivered any cattle. The seller would have had to give this notice to
all secured parties known to the sellers to have interests in the same type of
inventory and to all secured parties who had filed a financing statement
covering the same type of inventory. This means that each cattle seller
would have had to check the records in the office of the Secretary of State
in Austin to ascertain which secured lenders had filed financing statements
covering security interests in the inventory of each buyer. In addition, be-
fore delivering the cattle to a buyer, each seller would have had to file a
financing statement in the Secretary of State's office signed by the proper
officer of that buyer.
In the case of the livestock seller who sells to many different buyers
the practical effect of compliance with these requirements would be total
disruption of the existing pattern of business practices in selling and ship-
ping of livestock. Every livestock seller would have to retain a lawyer in Au-
stin to check the records for prior security interests. Delivery would be de-
layed for several days while financing statements signed by the buyer were
sent to Austin for filing. The cattle would have to be fed with costly grain
for several days longer before slaughter. 227 The total cost of the production
of beef certainly would be increased.
It might be assumed that the ultimate consumer, the meat eater,
would bear the entire increase in cost. However, the issue is not so simple.
The ability of the different actors in any industry to shift costs depends
on many factors including the elasticity of' supply and demand. 228 Un-
227
 Interview with Randy Cox, rancher, Great Falls, Montana (Feb. 9, 1977) (notes on
file with the author).
22" Reflection will show that in an industry in which a slight rise in price will drastically
reduce the amount customers will purchase, it will be nearly impossible for a firm to shift a
cost forward. Conversely, the firm can shift costs most easily when the amount purchased will
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doubtedly, it is much easier to eliminate a transaction cost than to predict
who will bear it. And even if one could analyze the meat industry and de-
termine the distribution of a transaction cost within it, this should be no
guide to lawmaking. The Code extends to every industry, cash sellers in
every industry who take payment by check are affected by this , decision,
and there is no reason to expect that the distribution of a transaction cost
within one industry will resemble the distribution of the same cost in any
other industry. Thus all that can be concluded with certainty is that the
Samuels rule would increase the total cost of beef production.
The second undesirable effect of the Samuels rule is its inefficient and
expensive allocation of risk. The rule of Samuels is that a perfected secured
creditor, such as C.I.T., relying solely on an after acquired property clause
will prevail as a good faith purchaser for value over a cash seller, such as
the cattle sellers, exercising a right of reclamation. This rule applies even
when the demand for reclamation is made within the proper time limit. As
between the cattle sellers and C.1.T., this rule places the risk of Samuels'
insolvency on the cattle sellers. The issue here is not one of equity between
the little cattle sellers and the big finance company. After all, a feedlot may
be a tax shelter for wealthy investors and a lender a credit union owned by
small shareholders investing retirement income. The issue is a conflict be-
tween an already existing efficient mechanism for risk pooling as against an
unequipped, uninformed risk evaluator.
Accurate information about business risk is expensive. A centralized
organization whose specialty is risk evaluation can achieve information eco-
nomy.229 Lending institutions, such as C.1.T., can accurately and efficiently
estimate failure probability, evaluate the cost to a lender of the borrower's
default and distribute these costs through its interest rates. In contrast, it
would be very costly for many individual cash sellers, such as the cattle sel-
lers, to obtain this kind of information, and they usually would not have
the expertise to evaluate such information accurately. If the ignorant take
risks, they are likely to be wrong and incur a loss, thereby increasing the
transaction costs and the total social costs. The allocation of the risk to
C.I.T. therefore would provide the least expensive, most effective risk pool-
ing and the entire industry would benefit. 23"
drop almost not at all when the price goes up. Similarly, the firm will find it easy to shift costs
to customers where any decline in price results in a drastically reduced supply, and hard to
shift costs where supply changes little with price. At the same time, even if it cannot raise its
selling price to cover an increased cost, it may be able to maintain its profit by reducing the
price it pays for factors of production. See generally E. MANsrin.D. MicituEcoNostms. THEORY
AND APPLICATION,10 I - 10,.253-55, 408-09 (2d ed. 1970).
229 Evaluation of the risk that a loan will not be repaid is, of course, at the essence of
the decision making process of all lenders—banks, C.1.T., General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration. This evaluation is reflected in the decision whether to lend and then in the interest
rates charged to the borrower. Thus the critical special expertise of a lender is risk evaluation.
230 Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 499, 501-
02, 507-09 (1976). See also K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 134-36 (1971).
In industries where the cash seller is the sole source of the buyer's inventory (e.g. au-
.
tomobile manufacturer selling to dealer) this rationale may be thought to be less persuasive.
Giant manufacturers may well have the resources and expertise to evaluate accurately and ef-
ficiently their dealers' financial strengths and weaknesses. These suppliers may in fact already
be in the risk evaluation business. But even in the one supplier situation there is generally a
lending institution which is extending credit to die buyer by paying the supplier on a cash
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The undesirable economic consequences of the Samuels rule would
primarily affect cattle sellers, whose financial stability also has been
threatened by other events. Their financial stability already has been un-
dermined by the failure of one hundred sixty-seven meat packers from
1958 to 1975. These failures resulted in the loss of over forty-five million
dollars by American livestock sellers. The 1975 bankruptcy of American
Beef Packers, Inc., the "grand-daddy of all packer faitures," 23 ' left livestock
sellers with bad checks totalling over twenty million dollars. Over forty mil-
lion dollars has been collected in receivables from the livestock sold since
the bankruptcy filing. 232 None of this money has gone to pay the livestock
sellers. 233
The state and federal response to these crippling losses by cattle sel-
lers has been legislation creating new statutory priorities for cattle sellers
which would exempt them from the application of the general scheme of
Article 9 of the Code. The Texas legislature passed a law specifically for
the protection of sellers of livestock for slaughter. 234 That statute gives live-
stock sellers, upon delivery of the livestock to the purchaser, an attached,
perfected lien on "such animal, its carcass, all products therefrom, and pro-
ceeds thereof," 233 in order to secure payment of the purchase price. This
lien has priority over any other lien or perfected security interest in the
livestock, its carcass, all products therefrom and proceeds thereof. 233 The
federal legislative response was to create another kind of exception to Arti-
cle 9. 237
 After extensive congressional hearings, Congress amended the
PSA to establish a trust for unpaid cash sellers of livestock in their livestock
and its proceeds in the hands of the packer. 23 H
basis, and it is highly inefficient to require a duplication of the credit extending function. "The
ultimate objective of the credit process is to minimize the overall social costs of capital through
a complex allocation of costs, including the disutility of the risk, between the borrower and the
lender." Posner, supra at 509. It would, of course, be possible for cattle sellers to create an en-
tirely new lending risk evaluating institution and/or insurance company of their own of some
kind. This inquiry has been limited to who is the superior risk bearer in this situation given
the existing institutions.
231
 Hearings on H.R. 8410, .supra note 3, at 72-73 (statement of B.H. Jones, National
Livestock Feeders Association).
232 1d.
233 1d.
234 PAYMENT FOR LIVESTOCK PURCHASED FOR SLAUGHTER ACC. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 69106 (Vernon Supp. 19A, 1976-77).
235 1d.	 4.
2 38 Id. §§ 5, 7.
237 Article 9 does expressly exempt from its coverage liens "given by statute or other
rule of law for services or materials." Section 9-104(c) Comment 3 explains that the drafters
had in mind liens determined in large part by local conditions and "far removed from ordi-
nary commercial financing." Cattle seller's liens would seem to have everything to do with or-
dinary commercial financing.
235 The amendment to the PSA, Act of September 13. 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-410, 90
Stat. 1251 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1976) ), states in part:
206(a). It is hereby found that a burden on and obstruction to commerce
in livestock is caused by financing arrangements under which packers encumber,
give lenders security interest (sic) in, or place liens on, livestock purchased by
packers in cash sales, or on inventories of or receivables or proceeds from meat,
meat food products, or livestock products therefrom, when payment is not made
for the livestock and that such arrangements are contrary to the public interest.
This section is intended to remedy such.burden on and obstruction to commerce
in livestock and protect the public interest.
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All of this legislative activity should have been unnecessary. Unpaid
cash sellers who exercise their right to reclaim their goods or the proceeds
within a time limit which is reasonable under all the circumstances, should
prevail under the Code over a secured creditor claiming only by virtue of an
after acquired property clause. Both the policies and the provisions of the
Code are consistent with this result.
(b) All livestock purchased by a packer in cash sales, and all inventories of,
or receivables or proceeds from meat, meat food products, or livestock products
derived therefrom, shall be held by such packer in trust for the benefit of all un-
paid cash sellers of such livestock until full payment has been received by such
unpaid sellers: Provided, that any packer whose average annual purchases do not
exceed $500,000 will be exempt from the provisions of this section. Payment shall
not be considered to have been made if the seller receives a payment instrument
which is dishonored: Provided, that the unpaid seller shall lose the benefit of such
trust if, in the event that a payment instrument has not been received within
thirty days of the final date for making a payment under section 409, or within
fifteen business days after the seller has received notice that the payment instru-
ment promptly presented for payment has been dishonored, the seller has not
preserved his trust under this subsection. The trust shall be preserved by giving
written notice to the packer and by filing such notice with the Secretary.
(c) For the purpose of this section, a cash sale means a sale in which the
seller does not expressly extend credit to the buyer ....
Sec. 410. No requirement of any State or territory of the United States, or
any sub-division thereof, or the District of Columbia, with respect to bonding of
packers or prompt payment by packers for livestock purchases may be enforced
upon any packer operating in compliance with the ... prompt payment provision
of section 409 of this Act .. . . Provided, That this section shall not preclude a
State from enforcing a requirement, with respect to payment for livestock pur-
chased by a packer at a stockyard subject to this Act, which is not in conflict with
this Act or the regulations thereunder: Provided further, That this section shall not
preclude a State from enforcing State law or regulations with respect to any
packer not subject to this Act , ,
The major difference between the PSA amendment and the Texas statute, see text and
notes 235-36 supra, is that while the Texas statute creates a lien effective automatically upon
delivery of the livestock to the buyer, the PSA amendment requires that the trust be preserved
by notice to the packer and the Secretary after a specified time. To some degree, both statutes
create preferences which overlap areas covered by the Bankruptcy Act, §§ 1-755, I I U.S.C. $$
1-1255 (1970).
For the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, a statutory lien is a "lien arising solely by force
of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions," 11 U.S.C, § 1(29a) (1970) (emphasis
added). Collier suggests that a statutory trust designed to protect one class of creditors should
be treated as the functional equivalent of a statutory lien, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuVI'CY,
67.25(2) (1976). The courts may well take a different view, however, since the PSA trust re-
quires the cattle seller to file with the Secretary in order to preserve the trust, and thus it
could be argued that although the trust functions like a statutory lien, the trust does not arise
solely by force of statute.
Assuming, however, that the courts would be willing to treat the PSA cattle sellers' trust
as a statutory lien, § 67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1970), would make both
the federal trust and the Texas lien valid against the trustee since they were established by
statute to protect an economic class, provided they were not invalidated by § 67(c) of the Act,
11 U.S.C. § 107(c). This would be true even if there remained some legal proceedings pre-
requisite to the realization of benefit from the liens. 4 COWER ON BANKRUPTCY, 67.20(9)
(1976). Briefly, section 67(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act invalidates the following liens against
the trustee: (1) Statutory liens which become effective only upon the insolvency of the debtor,
(2) statutory liens which are not enforceable against a bona fide purchaser on the date of the
bankruptcy, and (9) statutory liens for rent. Since neither the federal trust nor the Texas lien
in favor of cattle sellers falls into any of the § 67(c)(1) exclusions, they would be valid against
the trustee.
Since the PSA amendment only applies to packers purchasing more than $500,000 on
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The Samuels rule applies to similar conflicts between cash sellers and
secured lenders in all industries governed by the Code. There is every rea-
son to believe that when the rule has similar effects on another industry
which has access to the federal government, there again will be particular
legislation to protect that industry's cash sellers. One of the purposes of the
Code was to create broad general rules applicable to all commercial transac-
tions. This purpose is defeated by piecemeal legislative solutions to the uni-
versal problems of risk allocation.
B. Proposed Solution Under the Code
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code is
not flexible enough to provide an equitable resolution to this very real eco-
nomic conflict between unpaid cash sellers and secured financers. The en
banc opinion expressed the view that the sellers' losses were easily avoid-
able, since the sellers "merely" had to comply with the Code's filing pro-
visions in order to perfect their purchase money security interests which
would then have priority over C.I.T.'s security interest. 232 "As it happens,"
the court remarked, "the sellers did not perfect." 24 ° Of course the sellers
did not perfect; the steps required for perfection, as discussed above, typi-
cally would be impractical, cumbersome and expensive. It seems ludicrous
to interpret the Code in a manner which disrupts business patterns de-
veloped to decrease expenses of production,24 ' and which compels a cash
seller to increase costs in order to protect itself against bad checks. 242 A bet-
ter understanding of the commercial transactions involved coupled with a
more creative, less mechanical reading of the Code leads to an equitable
resolution of this conflict, a conflict not unique to the meat industry.
This proposed solution under the Code is based on the following
major premises. First, the transactions in question were cash sales and
Samuels' failure to pay gave the cattle sellers a right of reclamation. Sec
ond, the cattle sellers did not lose their right to reclaim by their delay.
Third, the cattle sellers' right to reclaim extended to the proceeds of the
an annual average, and since the amendment expressly disavows preemption regarding pack-
ers not covered by the amendment, only the Texas statute applies where cattle sellers deal
with the smaller packers. Sellers dealing with larger packers, however, may find a conflict as to
whether the PSA amendment or the Texas statute is the applicable lien law for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act. This would be of particular importance if the courts refused to treat the
PSA trust as a statutory lien.
It is clear that the PSA amendment preempts all contrary state laws, but preemption is
unclear in the situation where the state law has the same purposes but affords more protec-
tion. A full discussion of constitutional preemption is beyond the scope of this article. It is
submitted, however, that the PSA amendment ought not to preempt the Texas statute. The
intent of Congress in passing the PSA amendment was to provide a minimum safeguard for
cattle sellers. Rather than being an obstacle to this purpose, the Texas statute provides greater
protection to the cattle sellers by making perfection of the lien automatic upon delivery of the
cattle. Furthermore, the language of the statute explicitly permitting states to enforce statutes
which do not conflict with the PSA is strong support for the argument that Congress has not
occupied the field. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143
(1962), approved in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976). See Burke, Secured Transactions,
32 Bus. LAW, 1133, 1152 (1977).
222 526 F,2d at 1247.
245 1d. at 1244.
2" See note 22 supra.
242
 See text at notes 21-22 supra.
140
CASH SELLERS AND SECURED FINANCERS
cattle. Fourth, C.I.T. was not a good faith purchaser for value who prevails
over an unpaid cash seller exercising a right to reclaim. Fifth, even if the
cattle sellers lost their right of reclamation due to delay, they had a per-
fected Article 2 security interest in the cattle which was not subordinate to
C.I.T.'s perfected Article 9 security interest. This solution will now be
examined in detail.
1. The Transactions between the Cattle Sellers and Samuels & Co. were
Cash Sales and Samuels' Failure to Pay gave the Sellers a Right to Reclaim.
The decisions in the case, the referee's findings of fact as to the intent
and understanding of the sellers, 2 " and the realities of the economic re-
lationships between cattle sellers and packers all support the conclusion that
the transactions in the Samuels case were cash sales."' The delay imposed
by the PSA regulations 245 of approximately forty-eight hours from the time
of delivery of' the cattle to the issuance of the checks by Samuels was a long
standing usage of the trade. 2 ' This delay did not change the understand-
ing of the parties about either the nature of the transaction or its legal ef-
fect. Although a cattle seller always would prefer to sell on the hoof for
immediate payment based on live weight, in a buyer's market the seller
usually does not have the leverage to do so. The PSA regulations provide
that when a seller sells on a grade and yield basis, the packer must pay
within two or three days. The cattle sellers in Samuels by selling on a grade
and yield basis, were not relying on Samuels' future receivables to enable
Samuels to pay for the cattle. Rather, they were relying on Samuels' present
solvency, and they viewed the checks as cash payment. 2"
It could be argued, of course, that under the literal language of the
Code the transaction in Samuels was not a cash sale. Section 2-507(2), deal-
ing with cash sales, states that "where payment is due and demanded on
the delivery to the buyer of the goods, the buyer's right as against the seller
to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment
due." There is no question that payment was neither "due" nor "de-
manded" by the sellers on delivery of the cattle to Samuels. Thus, under a
literal reading of section 2-507(2) the transaction was not a cash sale. Such
a construction, however, would transform every seller on a grade and yield
basis into a creditor. Cash sales under the grade and yield regulations of
the PSA would be impossible.
A narrow, literal construction of the concept of the cash sale"' has
been expressly rejected by the Code in its treatment of payment by check.
Section 2-511 makes it clear that payment by check although "conditional
and defeated as between the parties by dishonor" does not convert a trans-
243 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 24.
244 aee U.C.C. §§ 2-507(2), 2-51 1(3).
245 See text at notes 55-58 supra.
"6 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 23.
247 The obvious question is why the cattle sellers do not ask for certified checks from
packer-buyers. The equally obvious answer is that the sellers do not have sufficient economic
leverage to do so.
248 For a history of the doctrine of cash sale, see 2 S. Wit.i.isToN, THE LAW GOVERNING
SALES OF Goons AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES Acr, §§ 342-44 (1948). Pro-
fessor Williston explained in 343 that "Monfusion may be caused by use of the words 'cash
sale' or 'terms cash' by businessmen. In business dealings these words are frequently used
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action into a credit sale. 249
 The purpose of this section is explained in
Comment 4 as the recognition of payment by check as a "commercially
normal and proper practice" which "is not to be penalized in any way."
An analogous approach should be taken to the type of transaction in
Samuels. The delivery of goods with payment postponed for the sole pur-
pose of determining the price by weighing and grading—and only for the
period required to make that determination—is a normal commercial prac-
tice which is not understood or intended by the parties as a credit sale. 25°
The construction of these transactions as cash sales by the Fifth Circuit in
its panel and en banc decisions, therefore, was not an extension of the con-
cept of cash sales, but rather was a proper characterization of a way to
achieve a statutory purpose which is also economically desirable.
2. Cattle Sellers did not Lose their Right of Reclamation by Failing to
Make a Demand for the Goods within Ten Days.
Sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) contain no express statement of a cash
seller's right to reclaim unpaid for goods in the event of dishonor of a
check or a buyer's insolvency. The implication of this right from the lan-
guage of these provisions, however, is entirely logical. Comment 3 to sec-
tion 2-507 states that the ten day limitation on the exercise of a credit sel-
ler's right of reclamation applies to cash sellers.
If the statute itself had imposed a ten day limitation on a cash seller's
right to reclaim, Judge Godbold's statement in the en banc opinion that
"the Code's ten day provision is an absolute requirement," 251 would be de-
fensible. But the ten day limitation comes from the Comment, not the stat-
ute, This raises the question of the force of the Comments to the Code.
The Comment to the Title states that the drafters intended the com-
ments to be an "aid in uniform construction ... in viewing the [U.C.C.] as
an integrated whole and to safeguard against misconstruction." 252 There is
no indication that the Texas legislature considered the comments before
adopting the Code. It would seem clear that when a statutory provision,
such as 2-507(2), does not support a statement in a comment, the comment
should be rejected. 253
when in reality a short period of credit is contemplated. In such a case it is clear that there is
no cash sale in the legal sense." Speaking directly to the situation where negotiable paper is
given in a supposed 'cash sale,' he continues that:
A very common kind of transaction where the transfer of the property in goods
is conditional on the buyer's performance of his promise is where the buyer is, by
the terms of the bargain, to give negotiable paper. In such a case there is less
reason to construe the bargain as a transfer of the property with a lien in favor
of the seller for the desired security than where the bargain calls for payment of
the price in cash, since negotiable paper may be executed at any time when the
parties have made up their minds that the property shall pass; whereas the actual
payment of the price may be inconvenient at the time when the bargain is agreed
upon.
Id. 1 344.
mi See text at note 117 supra.
2" Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 24.
2" 526 F.2d at 1245.
222 U.C.C. Title, Comment. The Texas Business and Commerce Code (U.C.C.), supra
note 12, omits this comment.
"3 See Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 547 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1977)
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a court chose to analogize a cash seller's right of reclamation to a
credit seller's right, the cattle sellers in the Samuels case might well have lost
their right to reclaim the cattle by their failure to reclaim within ten days.
The ten day limitation on the credit seller's right of reclamation, however,
does not apply if a "misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
particular seller in writing within three months of the delivery" of the
goods.
On the facts of Samuels it is reasonable to assume that the packing
company knew of the likelihood that the checks it issued to pay for this cat-
tle would be dishonored. Samuels & Co. certainly knew its own shaky fi-
nancial condition. Therefore, it also must have known that C.I.T. might re-
fuse the next weekly advance. On the basis of these facts the issuing of
these checks could be analogized to a misrepresentation of solvency. If the
purpose of the misrepresentation exception is to penalize a buyer's de-
liberate misrepresentations of solvency to a seller, this policy would dictate
that this exception be applied to the cash seller as well. And if the view that
Comment 3 to section 2-507 controls here is accepted, then as between cat-
tle sellers and Samuels & Co., the sellers had an unlimited time in which to
make a demand for reclamation of their goods.
Alternatively, if the better position is taken that the statute, and not
the Comment, controls, then there is no statutory time limit on a cash sel-
ler's right of reclamation. However, both the absence of any statutory time
limit on a cash seller's right of reclamation and the rational policy need for
some time limitation, argue for the use of a flexible time limit such as a
"reasonable time." It is necessary to place a time limit on the cash sellers'
right to reclaim, "to promptly disclose and identify the claim(s] in the bank-
rupt's estate so that other creditors' claims are not prejudiced." 2" The
reasonableness of the time should be judged by whether any creditor of, or
purchaser from, the defaulting buyer relied on the buyer's possession of
the goods.
In Samuels the cattle sellers filed their petition on May 20, 1970, one
year after Samuels & Co. tiled a petition for reorganization under Chapter
(court refused to follow the Comment to 9-302(1) on grounds that Utah had not adopted the
comment and a more equitable result could be reached on the plain words of the statute); In
re Bel Air Carpets, 452 F.2d 1210, 1211, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971) (The court rejected the state-
ment in U.C.C. § 2-702(2) Comment 2 that a written misrepresentation of solvency must be
"dated within three months of the delivery" (emphasis added). Citing policy, the court adopted
the view that such a misrepresentation must be delivered within three months to fall under §
2-702(2).); Wright v. Bank of Cal., Nat'l Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14
(1969) ("The plain language of the Statute cannot be varied by reference to the comments.");
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 314-15, 363 A.2d 460, 464 (1976) (court held
that under § 2-607 there is no notice of injury required for non-"buyers," specifically rejecting
Comment 5 because (1) the comments were not enacted by the legislature and (2) the statutory
language itself' clearly mandated this result, thus making it unnecessary to reach the Com-
ment). But see Editor's note, 20 U.C.C. REP. 1361 (1977).
The 1952 edition of the Code, § 1-102(1), provided: "The comments of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be
consulted in the construction and application of this Act but if text and comment conflict, text
controls," The 1957 edition of the Code deleted this provision as recommended by the 1956
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. The reason pre-
sented was that "... the old comments were clearly out of date and it was not known when
new ones could be prepared." Revised Comments were prepared for the 1957 and 1958 edi-
tions but § 1-102(f) has never reappeared. See generally Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments
to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wisc, L. REv, 597.
254 510 F.2d at 147.	 143
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XI and three weeks after Samuels & Co. was adjudicated a bankrupt. 255
However, as the panel opinion emphasizes, extensive disclosures of
Samuels' financial affairs had taken place two months after the filing of the
Chapter XI petition at a hearing before Referee Whitehurst. 256 This hear-
ing was pursuant to a petition for reclamation filed by C.I.T. an July 23,
1969. The referee's order expressly "reserved for further consideration any
question pertaining to conflicting claims or lien or lien priorities." 257
 Thus,
C.I.T. knew of the cattle sellers' outstanding claims two months after
Samuels' insolvency and could not have been prejudiced by the cattle sel-
lers' delay.
Since no actual creditors were harmed, and C.I.T., the competing
creditor, had knowledge of the sellers' claim soon after the defaulting
buyer's receipt of the goods, the purpose of a time limitation is satisfied. In
a situation such as this, the sellers should not be barred from asserting
their claim. 258
3. The Right of Reclamation of the Goods includes the Right to Reclaim
the Proceeds of those Goods.
The purpose of the reclamation right is to give a defrauded seller the
right to recover from a defrauding buyer. The Code is silent as to the
rights of sellers to reclaini the proceeds of the unpaid-for goods. To say
that this right, as between the parties, is cut off by transformation of the
goods into proceeds defeats the statutory purpose. In Samuels, any right to
reclaim, limited to the goods, was illusory because the goods—meat—were
sold under the direction of the court "with proceeds to be held subject to
the order of the court."252 In addition, the PSA regulations required that
the goods—livestock—be transformed into proceeds—meat—immediately
upon delivery. 280 A buyer's compliance with the requirements of the
applicable federal law should not deprive a defrauded seller of his Code
right to reclaim. The cattle sellers' right to reclaim should include the right
to reclaim the proceeds of the cattle.
4. C.I.T. is not a Good Faith Purchaser for Value and cannot take Good
Title from Samuels & Co. under Section 2-403(1).
The Fifth Circuit en banc opinion accurately observed that C.I.T.'s
status as a "purchaser" under the Code is "of great significance to a proper
understanding and resolution of this case under Article Two and Article
Nine." 2" However, the court was wrong in concluding that C.I.T. was a
"purchaser" of Samuels & Co.'s after acquired property. A perfected se-
cured creditor should not be considered a good faith purchaser for value
255 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 3, 6.
256 Id. at 41.
2 " 7 1d. at 44-45.
"s The panel decision's reasoning on this question is extremely persuasive and is an in-
terpretation and application of the Code that is "limited to its reason." U.C.C. § 1-102, Com-
ment I.
Iss Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 21.
260 See text at notes 55.58 supra.
261 526 F.2d at 1242-43.
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within section 2-403(1) as to after acquired property when it has not made
an additional advance in reliance on the buyer's possession of the specific
property involved. Without such reliance, the secured creditor has not en-
tered into a voluntary transaction with respect to the after acquired
property.
The Code defines a purchaser as someone who takes by "sale,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or other
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." 262 This definition is
broad enough to encompass a security interest, which is an interest in the
debtor's property given by the debtor to the creditor. It is not broad
enough, however, to include an interest of a secured creditor which arises
automatically by virtue of an after acquired property clause. 2" It is true
that C.I.T.'s interest in Samuels & Co.'s after acquired property was created
by a voluntary transaction in the sense that Samuels & Co. voluntarily gave
this interest to C.I.T. at the time of the original security agreement. How-
ever, C.I.T.'s interest in the after acquired cattle attached automatically by
operation of law at the mystical moment when Samuels & Co. had suffi-
cient "rights in the collateral." 264 As of that moment it is impossible to say
that C.I.T. took its interest in the cattle by a voluntary transaction. If
C.I.T.'s "rights" in the cattle did not arise voluntarily, C.I.T. cannot be a
Code purchaser.
The requirement that a purchaser under section 2-403(1) be a pur-
chaser in good faith further illustrates that the Code requires a voluntary
transaction. Assuming that C.I.T.'s purchase of all Samuels' inventory then
owned or thereafter acquired by virtue of the security agreement made it a
purchaser of the after acquired cattle, the question still remains whether
C.I.T. was a purchaser in good faith. It makes no sense to look at C.I.T.'s
knowledge and actions at the time of the original security agreement in
order to determine this issue. C.I.T. had no interest in cattle and proceeds
until Samuels acquired them years after the original security agreement.
What has to be determined is the moment when C.I.T. was required to
have good faith.
The en bane opinion looked to the moment C.I.T. failed to make its
weekly advance to Samuels and observed that it is not bad faith to dis-
continue financing a doomed enterprise. 262 This, though, was not the
proper moment at which to measure C.I.T.'s good or bad faith. Under sec-
tion 2-403(1) C.I.T. must be a good faith "purchaser," that is, C.I.T. must
be in good faith at the moment of "purchase."
265 U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (emphasis added). See cases cited at note 133 .copra.
563 See text and note 137 supra.
2" U.C.C. § 9-203(1). When Samuels & Co. received delivery of the cattle it had not
only the right but the legal duty to slaughter the livestock immediately so that it could be
chilled and weighed for pricing. See text at notes 80-83 supra. This would seem to meet the
"rights in the collateral" test as It has been defined by the courts. See COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Ch. 4, 4.06 (1966) [hereinaf-
Ler cited as COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS] and cases cited therein. See text at notes 89-90 supra. It
would of course be possible to take the view of the Fifth Circuit panel decision that C.I.T.'s
security interest had not attached because Samuels did not have sufficient rights in the collat-
eral. 510 F.2d at 150-51. In view of the facts of this case, this result does not seem to be per-
suasive.
565 526 F.2d at 1243.
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The moment at which C.I.T. could have become a purchaser was at
delivery of the cattle to Samuels & Co., when C.I.T.'s security interest in
the cattle attached. Examining C.I.T.'s good faith at that moment presents
a dilemma. C.I.T.'s good faith at that moment turns on whether C.1.T.'s
knowledge and behavior at that time met the Code definition of.good faith
as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade."'" If a creditor is not conscious that a transac-
tion has occurred no honesty or observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards with respect to that transaction is possible.'" Since there is no evi-
dence that C.I.T. had any knowledge of the delivery of the cattle to
Samuels by any of the sellers, it had no faith of any kind at that moment.
Therefore, C.I.T. could not have been a purchaser in good faith.
C.I.T.'s status as a purchaser and its good faith would be different if
C.I.T. had made an advance in reliance on Samuels' possession of this cat-
tle. Then C.I.T. would have been a Code purchaser of the cattle. Samuels
would have told C.I.T. of its possession of the cattle; C.I.T. would have ad-
vanced money in reliance on the cattle and its proceeds as security, and
C.I.T.'s security. interest would be the result of a voluntary transaction. On
those facts, the state of C.I.T.'s knowledge as to Samuels' title and C.I.T.'s
actions could be examined in the light of the Code definition of good faith.
In Samuels, however, there was no such voluntary transaction to create
C.I.T.'s interest in the after acquired cattle.'" As a result, C.I.T. should
not have been held to be a good faith purchaser for value who could obtain
good title from Samuels & Co. under section 2-403(I).
5. Even if the Cattle Sellers lost their Right of Reclamation Due to Delay,
They have a Perfected Article Two Security' Interest in the Cattle which is
not Subordinate to C.1.T.'s Perfected Article Nine Security Interest.
The district court2" and the Fifth Circuit en banc27° ruled that, under
sections 2-401 and 9-113, the sellers' interests in the cattle were limited to
security interests subject to Article 9. Both courts concluded that the prior-
ity rules of Article 9 subordinated the sellers' unperfected purchase money
security interests to C.I.T.'s perfected security interest in the cattle and its
proceeds as after acquired property. These decisions ignored the provisions
of section 9-113. This section exempts from Article 9 filing requirements a
26° Section 2-103(1)(h). See text and notes 128-31 supra.
267 The law may give the creditor (C.1.T.) certain status as a result of the transaction be-
tween the cattle sellers and the buyer-debtor (Samuels & Co.), but good faith and bad faith
have nothing to do with that status.
'6" The Code requirement of a voluntary transaction also has an arguable effect on the
question whether a secured party whose security interest predates a sellers reclamation rights
has given value for a security interest in the debtor's after acquired property. Under a minor-
ity view, the secured party must show that it made an additional advance in reliance on the
buyer's possession of after acquired property as collateral in order to have given value. Under
the generally accepted view, a preexisting claim constitutes value for a security interest in after
acquired property. See text and notes 138.43 supra. Under the minority interpretation of
value, C.I.T., to qualify as a good faith purchaser for value, would have to prove that when it
made its weekly advance to Samuels & Co., it relied on Samuels' possession of the after ac-
quired cattle. Since this showing also goes to the questions of purchase and good faith, the
issue of value need never be reached.
:69
 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 31-33.
270 526 F.2d at 1247.
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security interest arising solely under Article 2 when the debtor does not
lawfully obtain possession of the goods. 2 " The section provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Arti-
cle Two) is subject to the provisions of this Article except that to
the extent that and so long as the debtor does not have or does
not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the se-
curity interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security in-
terest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the
debtor are governed by the Article on Sales (Arti-
cle Two). 272
Under section 9-113, if the cattle sellers had a security interest in the cattle
which arose solely under Article 2 and if Samuels & Co. did not lawfully
obtain possession of the cattle, the courts' classification of Samuels' interest
as an unperfected purchase money security interest is incorrect.
It is clear that the sellers had "security interests" in the cattle arising
solely under Article 2. The referee found that the cattle sellers intended
that title to the cattle would not pass to Samuels until payment was re-
ceived. 273 Under section 2-401, such a retention of title by the seller after
delivery of the goods is limited in effect to a reservation of a security in-
terest. 274 The only question, then, is whether Samuels & Co. lawfully ob-
tained possession of the cattle.
No court ever considered this issue. Hence, Samuels & Co.'s knowl-
edge of its own financial condition when it took delivery and issued the
checks to pay for the cattle can only be inferred from the facts in the rec-
ord. Samuels took delivery of the cattle and issued checks to the cattle sel-
lers between May 12 and May 23, 1969. 275 On May 23, C.I.T. refused to
make its weekly advance and on the same day Samuels filed a plan of ar-
rangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.'" The Fifth Circuit,
in its first panel decision, noted that "C.I.T. became insecure ... upon
learning that Samuels intended to file a plan of arrangement under Chap-
ter XI."2 " In a Large company with a number of plants and total weekly
sales as high as one million dollars, 2 " the decision to file under the Bank-
ruptcy Act is not made and acted on in one day. At the very least, when it
obtained possession of the cattle and issued these checks to the cattle sel-
lers, Samuels & Co. had to have been aware of its precarious financial posi-
tion. It is not unreasonable to assume that Samuels & Co. knew that the
checks would be dishonored when presented for payment.
"' Section 9-302(1)(i) also lists this exception to requirement of' filing for perfection.
272 U.C.C. § 9.113 (emphasis added).
2" Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 25. See text at note 98 supra.
See text at notes 100-01 supra,
"5 Record Appendix, supra note 30, at 24.
"5 id. at 20, 21.
277
	 17.2d at 559. The fact that Samuels intended to file prior to C.1.T.'s failure to
make its weekly advance does not appear in the Referee's findings of fact. Record Appendix,
supra note 30, at 28-29.
278 Id. at 20.
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The question then is whether taking delivery of goods and the is-
suance of bad checks in payment with this knowledge constitute unlawfully
obtaining possession of the goods. The phrase "unlawfully obtaining pos-
session" is not defined anywhere in the Code so we must look to other state
law.278
 Non-Code contract law in Texas seems to be that a buyer's intent
not to pay for goods is required to support rescission and reclamation by
the seller, but that this intent can be shown by the fact that the buyer has
no reasonable expectation of being able to pay. 28 ° If Samuels & Co. in-
tended to file a Chapter XI petition on May 23, its officers were unlikely to
have a reasonable expectation of being able to pay checks issued to cattle
sellers between May 12 and May 23.
Under the Texas Penal Code a person obtains property unlawfully if
that person induces the owner to consent by words or conduct which create
"a false impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction" and that the actor does not believe to be true."'
Surely, the issuing of a check creates the impression on the recipient that
2 " U.C.C. § 1-103 reads in part: "Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable. Un-
less displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the principles of law and equity, ...
shall supplement its provisions."
"° Under Texas common law, fraud would sustain rescission and reclamation if it were
proved to be "fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong"; a "mere intent
not to pay for goods when the bill becomes due ... [was) ... insufficient ... [for there] ...
must be intent never to pay for the goods ...." Higginbotham-Bartlett Co. v, Powell, 270
S.W. 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) (court refused to disturb jury finding that buyer did not
have intent to defraud where buyer knew his assets exceeded his debts at time of sale). The
intent not to pay for goods, however, could be "evidenced by circumstances, as by the fact that
purchaser had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay for the goods] ...." Boerner v.
Cicero-Smith Lumber Co., 298 S.W. 545, 547 (Tex. 1927) (court found insufficient evidence
of intent not to pay where solvent credit purchaser made purchases in the usual course of
business).
In the extreme case, the Texas Supreme Court found that where two buyers of a used
car had given the seller a $50 check drawn on a bank where they had no funds, the buyers
had unlawfully obtained possession of the auto and the seller could cancel the sale and retake
possession. Weatherford v. Aetna Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. 1964) (the issue was
whether seller's insurance covered buyers while they were unlawfully in possession; the court
determined it did not).
The majority of jurisdictions agree with this result. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Stainless Pro-
cessing Co., 465 F.2d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1972) (court allowed cancellation of contract where
buyer gave seller a check with a stop payment order on it as security for delivery of nickel);
Mulroney Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 717-18, 171 N.W. 36, 37-38 (1919) (buyer de-
livering bad check to seller to induce delivery constitutes fraud, permitting seller to reclaim
goods sold despite buyer's subsequent bankruptcy).
See generally 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,1 70.41, at 486 (1976); 3 S. WitusToN, THE
LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT,
§§ 631-37 (rev. ed. 1948); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1921).
"I The Texas Penal Code in various sections provides:
§ 31.06. Presumption for Theft by Check
(a) If the actor obtained property ... by issuing ... a check ... for the payment
of money, when the issuer did not have sufficient funds in or on deposit with the
bank ... for the payment in full of the check ... as well as all other checks or
orders then outstanding, his intent to deprive the owner of property under Sec-
tion 31.03 of this code [Theft) ... is presumed ... if:
• • •
(2) payment was refused by the bank or other drawee for lack of
funds or insufficient funds, on presentation within 30 days after is-
sue, and the issuer failed to pay the holder in full within 10 days
after receiving notice of that refusal.
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the check will be honored. If between May 12 and 23 the officers of
Samuels & Co. knew or must have known that the checks would not be
honored and that payment would not, be made, there is an excellent argu-
ment that they obtained the cattle by inducing a false impression on the
part of the cattle sellers. By either standard, Samuels would have un-
lawfully obtained possession of the cattle.
If Samuels obtained possession of the cattle unlawfully, it is clear
under section 9-113 that the cattle sellers had perfected Article 2 security
interests in the cattle. How section 9-113 affects the outcome of the conflict
between those Article 2 security interests and C.1.T.'s perfected Article 9
security interest in the same cattle is not clear. Section 9-113(c) provides
that "the rights of a secured party on default by a debtor are governed by
[Article 2]," as opposed to Article 9. 282 If the cattle sellers lost their right of
reclamation by their delay, then resolution of the conflict between the sel-
lers' and C.I.T.'s interests depends largely on the interpretation of this sub-
section.
There are two possible interpretations of section 9-113(c). The more
literal interpretation is that 9-113(c) makes inapplicable to the cattle sellers'
interests only the Article 9 provisions which deal with procedures on de-
fault, while the priority rules of Article 9 still apply. The second interpreta-
tion is that section 9-113(c) exempts the cattle sellers' interests from the Ar-
ticle 9 priority provisions as well. Under the first interpretation cattle sellers
might possibly prevail over C.I.T. and at a minimum would share pro rata
with C.I.T. in the proceeds of the cattle. Under the second interpretation
the cattle sellers would prevail.
A literal reading of section 9-113(c) leads to the conclusion that this
subsection was intended solely to make part 5 of Article 9, entitled "De-
fault," inapplicable to security interests arising solely under Article 2. In-
deed, Comment 2 of section 9-113 states "paragraph (c) makes inapplicable
the default provisions of Part. 5 of this Article ...." This indicates that all
other provisions of Article 9, with the exception of the filing and security
agreement requirements explicitly made inapplicable by sections 9-113(a)
§ 31.03. Theft
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deprive the owner
of property:
(I) he obtains the property unlawfully:
(b) Obtaining or exercising control over property is unlawful if:
(I) the actor obtains or exercises control over the pro-
perty without the owner's effective consent; ...
§ 31.01. Definitions
In this chapter:
(2) "Deception" means:
(A) creating or confirming by words or conduct a false
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction, and that the
actor does not believe to be true;
(4) "Effective consent" includes consent by a person legally au-
thorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if:
(A) induced by deception or coercion; ...
"1 This provision is discussed at notes 271-73 supra.
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and (b) but including the priority rules, are applicable.'" There could be
no other reason for the statute to give Article 2 security interests perfected
status than to protect them in priority clashes governed by Article 9.
Cattle sellers' interests are in the nature of perfected purchase money
security interests because the attempted reservation of title was "by the sel-
ler to secure ... [the] price." 284 These interests are entitled to purchase
money priority over C.I.T.'s non-purchase-money perfected security in-
terest if the conditions of this special priority mandated by section 9-312(3)
have been met. 285
 As previously discussed, these conditions include not
only filing a financing statement, made unnecessary here by section 9-113,
but also giving notice to C.I.T. prior to Samuels' receiving possession of the
cattle.'" It would seem that the 9-113(b) exemption from filing to perfect
should be read to include an exemption from the notice requirement. The
purpose of section 9-113 is to protect the defrauded seller who has deliv-
ered the goods by exempting him from formal requirements which, by the
nature of the situation, he would never have fulfilled. To read the 9-113(b)
exemption from filing as leaving intact the notice requirement in this situa-
tion is to deprive all defrauded sellers of inventory who have delivered
goods to the buyer of the intended protection of section 9-113.
If the notice requirement of section 9-312(3) is still applicable to the
cattle sellers' security interests, the sellers would not be entitled to a pur-
chase money priority over C.I.T. since no notice was given. The priority
clash then would be governed by the "first to perfect" rule of section
9-312(5) (b). 287 C.1.T. had complied with the requirements for perfecting
its security interests in Samuels' existing inventory; but that security interest
could not attach to the cattle in question and therefore could not be per-
fected as to that cattle until Samuels & Co. acquired rights in the cattle. 288
2" White and Summers take the position that §§ 1-201(37), 9-102 and 9-113 "read to-
gether and literally require that all such priority clashes [between Article Two security in-
terests exempted from the Article Nine provisions by § 9-113 and Article Nine security in-
terests] be resolved under Article Nine." J. WHITE AND Ft. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 781 (1972). See also HOGAN,SRpra note 137, at 583 n.50.
45•
	 § 9-107(a). See note 94 supra.
4"5 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) provides in part:
In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between con-
flicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing, regardless of
which security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and, in the case of a
filed security interest, whether it attached before or after filing.
The 1972 version of this section gives priority to the security interest which was either filed or
perfected first, whichever occurred earlier. See Coogan, The New U.C.C. Article Nine, 86 HARV,
L. REV. 477, 507-08 (1973). Since C.J.T. filed long before this transaction it would prevail over
the cattle sellers under that rule, as would all perfected security interests in after acquired
property. This is an additional argument for the purchase money priority argument discussed
above, since it is the only way to protect the seller under the 1972 version of the Article 9
priority rules.
"" See text at notes 226-27 supra. This notice requirement applies only to purchase
money security interests in inventory. The livestock in this case became inventory in the hands
of Samuels & Co. which was not engaged in "farming operations." See U.C.C. § 9-109(3), (4).
"'See note 285 supra.
"° U.C.C. §§ 9-303(1), 9-204(1), 9-302.
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The cattle sellers' section 2-401 "security interest" in the cattle also became
perfected under section 9-113 at the moment when the debtor, Samuels,
acquired rights in the cattle. Since Samuels presumably acquired rights in
the cattle with respect to C.I.T. and the sellers at the same moment, both
security interests were perfected simultaneously. Under the literal in-
terpretation of section 9-1 13(c), the sellers would share with C.I.T. pro rata
in the proceeds of the cattle even if the sellers were subject to 9-312(3)
notice requirements. 289
The second interpretation of section 9-113 is that it exempts Article 2
security interests from the key provisions of Article 9, including the priority
provisions.290
 This interpretation is based on the rationale that it is other-
wise meaningless to refer a defrauded seller who has parted with his goods
to the default provisions of Article 2 while subjecting him to the priority
provisions of Article 9. Such a seller's only meaningful Article 2 remedy is
cancellation under section 2-703(1) and replevy of the goods. 291 If this right
is subordinate to interests of perfected secured creditors of the buyer in
"' Under the equitable doctrine of marshaling of assets, C.I.T. would have to exhaust
all of Samuels' other assets before claiming the proceeds of the cattle. The doctrine has been
applied by the Texas courts: "[IN one creditor by virtue of a lien or interest can resort to two
funds, and another to one of them only, the former must seek satisfaction out of that fund
which the latter cannot touch." New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Girduer, 28 S.W.2d 193, 196
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See, e.g., Moody Day Co. v. Westview Nat'l Bank, Waco, 452 S.W.2d
572, 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); 2 PostEativ, EQurry jukist , RuDENGE,§ 410 (1941).
2" "Until Article Nine thus (by the debtors obtaining lawful possession of the goods]
applies in lull, its other provisions have a very limited application, at best, to a 9-113 situation."
COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 264, at ch. 4, § 4.07 n.51 (emphasis added). No cases
have been found on this issue.
" 1 U.C.C. § 2-703 provides in part:
Where the buyer ... fails to make a payment due on or before delivery ... , the
aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee ...
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still un-
identified to the contract;
(d) resell and recover damages ...
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance ...
(I) cancel.
The Code definition of cancellation in § 2-106 is as follows:
(3) "Tertnination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are dis-
charged but any right based on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that
the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or
any unperformed balance.
Under Texas common law, the terms "cancellation" and "rescission" appear to be in-
terchangeable. Thus, when a used car dealer received a bad check as a down payment on an
auto and attempted to repossess the auto, the court agreed that he had the right to cancel the
sales contract and repossess the auto since the buyer had unlawfully obtained possession. Wea-
therford v, Aetna Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1964). Williston, however, explains that
"while termination (under the U.C.C.) discharges all obligations on both sides which are still
executory, leaving rights based on prior breach or performance surviving, in case of cancella-
tion, besides the foregoing, the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of the
whole contract or any unperformed balance." I S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF
Goons AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES Ac't', § 9d (1972 Supp.).
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after acquired property, the sellers' Article 2 rights on default are illu-
sory.292
 The language of section 9-113(c) providing that "the rights of the
secured party on default by the debtor are governed by (Article 2)" was
not intended to include only procedures on default, but the full exercise of
the rights of an unpaid seller under Article 2. This reading of section
9-113 would give the cattle sellers the right to cancel their contract with
Samuels and to replevy the proceeds of their goods free of C.1.T.'s security
interest. 293
The language of section 9-113 is ambiguous. Its purpose is clear: to
give defrauded sellers who have parted with their goods all of the protec-
tion of perfected secured creditors. This could have been achieved under
either of these interpretations of section 9-113. If the cattle sellers' interests
were subject to Article 9 priority rules by 9-113, they should have had pur-
chase money priority over C.I.T.'s competing claim, or at least a pro rata
share of proceeds. If these interests were exempt from the Article 9 prior-
ity rules under 9-113(c), the cattle sellers should have been given the right
under section 2-703(0 to cancel and replevy the proceeds of their goods.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit in Samuels transformed cash sellers into secured
creditors. The Samuels rule will increase transaction costs and social costs in
every industry governed by the Code. This discussion has attempted to
demonstrate that a careful, technical, and close reading of Articles 2 and 9
"2 See Peters, supra, note 127, at 218-21 and cases cited, discussing the arguments in
support of the view that the right to cancel includes the right to replevy the goods. U.C.C.
1-106 and the comments support this view. That section provides in part:
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed ...
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this Act is enforceable by action unless the
provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect.
2" As to the extension of the right to replevy the goods to the right to replevy the pro-
ceeds see text at notes 259-60 supra. Under pre-Code Texas Law where a seller has cancelled
the sale because of the buyer's fraud and seeks to recover the goods, seller has a superior
claim to that of an attaching creditor since the subsequent attaching creditor obtains no better
right to the property than the fraudulent purchaser. Blount-Decker Lumber Co. v. Farmer's
Lumber Co., 211 S.W, 247, 247-48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (Court reversed lower court holding
for creditor where bankrupt buyer had procured lumber from seller by misrepresentation as
to his solvency. Seller was permitted to reclaim lumber.). See also Mulroney Mfg. Co. v, Weeks,
185 Iowa 714, 717-18, 171 N.W. 36, 37-38 (1919) (Where insolvent buyer delivered bad check
to induce delivery, court found seller could reclaim the goods from the bankrupt or his trus-
tee and that such a reclamation did not work a preference in violation of the Bankruptcy
Act.).
In this type of action, "the seller is regarded not as a general creditor but as the proper
owner repossessing goods from one who has wrongfully deprived him of possession." Note,
Selected Priority Problems in Secured Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 YALE L. J.
751, 759 (1959). Collier explains that "the intervention of bankruptcy between bargain and re-
scission has not been allowed to interfere with the right to rescind and reclaim; the trustee in
bankruptcy takes little to the bankrupt's property subject to the retroactive diveStment effected
by such a rescission." 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 1 70.41 (1976). 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW
GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT. 636 (rev.
ed. 1948).
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of the Code, together with an understanding of the actual transactions to
which the Code was being applied in Samuels, could have led to a recovery
by the cattle sellers. Indeed, it should have led to their recovery. The oppo-
site result has justified another special exception to the Code's general
,scheme—the state statutes and the amendment to the PSA creating a spe-
cial priority for unpaid sellers of cattle to meat packers. This result ill serves the
Code's purpose and policy of simplifying and clarifying the law of commercial
transactions.
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